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Institutional and political forces create strong inertial
pressures that make updating legislation a difficult task. As a
result, laws often stagnate,leading to the continued existence of
obsolete rules and policies that serve long-forgotten purposes.
Recognizing this inertialpower, legislatures over the last few
decades have increasingly relied on a perceived solutiontemporary legislation.In theory, this measure avoids inertiaby
requiringlegislatorsto choose to extend a law deliberately.
This Article argues that temporary legislation is a doubleedged sword. While some temporary laws ultimately expire,
many perpetuate through cycles of extension and
reauthorization. Temporary legislation often creates its own
inertialforce, leading to the unintended permanence of what
was originally believed to be provisional. Using a case study
from a large public subsidy adopted as a localized fix to a
temporaryproblem, this Article demonstrates how the subsidy
has inadvertently grown in scope and in size, creating its own
inertialpathways that made its repeal exceedingly difficult.
Path-dependentdynamics of temporary legislationaffect not
only present-day policies, but also the ability of legislatures to
resist status quo bias and bring about legal change. This Article
concludes with normative insights on ways to utilize flexible
rulemaking whilst circumventing legislative inaction. Careful
design of expiringprovisions that is awareof the inertialpower
of temporary legislation can effectively ensure that laws are
kept or discardedgiven their merits, not by force of the past.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long recognized the dangers of statutory
stagnation.1 Powerful forces create inertia in our laws and statutes,
leading to perverse and sometimes bizarre results, such as laws that
criminalize the housing of a pirate or the mailing of a mongoose. 2
Less amusing, but of deep economic and social import, are a host of
dated tax,3 sanitary, 4 and safety regulations 5 meant to achieve longforgotten goals. 6 The inertial force of past legislation is explained by

1 See

GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 10-11 (1982) (noting

the harms of inertia and proposing that the judiciary is the most suitable actor to hinder
legislative inertia via adjudication); see also Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialFederalismand the
Future of FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 90 IOwA L. REV. 377, 472 (2005) ("The degree of
inertia in the legislative process is substantial, and it is far easier to block legislation than to
enact it."); John Copeland Nagle, CorrectionsDay, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1282-83 (1996)
(noting the disadvantages of legislative inertia). But see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the
Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348, 1389 (2006) (reviewing the current
criticism of judicial review of legislation and asserting the significance of inertia to
democracy).
2 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 42, 1716D (2018) (dealing with nonmailable injurious animals); 39 U.S.C.
§ 3015(a) (2018) (same); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1657 (2018) (dealing with pirates). For a
humorous overview of prohibited activities that are considered illegal by federal laws today,
see A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/CrimeADay (last visited
Mar. 10, 2021); see also MIKE CHASE, HOW TO BECOME A FEDERAL CRIMINAL: AN ILLUSTRATED
HANDBOOK FOR THE ASPIRING OFFENDER 1 (2019) (consolidating these and other examples);
SHERYL LINDSELL-ROBERTS, K.R. HOBBIE, TED LEVALLIANT & MARCEL THEROUX, WACKY
LAWS, WEIRD DECISIONS & STRANGE STATUTES 7 (2004) (outlining "[o]utlandish" statutes and
judicial decisions).
3 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5053(e), 5674(a) (2018) (prohibiting a person from brewing, tax-free,
over a hundred gallons of beer for personal consumption); cf. Eliminating Unnecessary Tax
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 9231 (Mar. 14, 2019) (to be codified in scattered parts of 26 C.F.R.)
(repealing nearly 300 duplicative and obsolete tax regulations dating back to 1942 following
an executive order signed by then-President Trump to review existing regulations and to
simplify the Tax Code).
4Under 9 C.F.R. § 93.415 (2020), removing llama manure from a quarantine facility is
strictly prohibited unless the llama who made the manure has been released.
5Under 16 C.F.R. § 1202.4 (2020), it is a federal crime for a matchbook maker to distribute
matchbooks that fail to comply with a minimum friction strip, a staple size, and certain cover
requirements. Similarly, 36 C.F.R. § 520.4(g) (2020) prohibits bringing strollers and baby
carriages into a zoo's exhibit buildings and public restrooms.
6 See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 336-38 (1990)
(arguing for the need to subordinate obsolete laws that no longer reflect strong policies); Melia
Robinson & Erin McDowell, The Most Ridiculous Law in Every State, BUS. INSIDER (June 23,
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a variety of political and institutional considerations, including
limited legislative resources, status quo bias, and partisan
interests.7 Doubtlessly, the inertial pull of these forces is strong.
To counter legislative inertia, lawmakers have increasingly
adopted self-terminating legislation. Examples used over the past
few decades include zero-base budget laws, 8 sunset clauses, 9
extenders,1 0
temporary-effects
laws,"
and
experimental
legislation.1 2 The common denominator of these legislative tools is
2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/weird-state-laws-across-america-2018-1
(claiming to identify the strangest statutes still on the books).
7 See infra Section IIA; see, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, New ConstitutionalIdeas: Can New
ParliamentaryModels Resist JudicialDominance When InterpretingRights?, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1963, 1979-80 (2004) (arguing that legislators have a disproportionate interest in ensuring
specific objectives rather than accommodating individual rights).
8 See Eloise Pasachoff, The President's Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
YALE L.J. 2182, 2210-11 (2016) (noting that, in the 1970s, there was an administrative
practice of agencies to "use Zero-Based Budgeting to prepare their budget requests-that is,
to prepare each year's request as if it were starting at zero"). But see David Gamage,
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
749, 793 n.197 (2010) ("Zero-base budgeting is seldom implemented in practice.").
9 "Sunset legislation" was coined in the 1970s by Common Cause, a prominent reformist
group that relied on Theodore Lowi's idea of "tenure of statutes." See Theodore Lowi, Lowi's
Intent andthe Originof Sunset, RIPON F., Spring 2009, at 27, 27 (explaining how the original
intent behind Professor Lowi's idea of the "tenure of statutes" was transformed by the group).
Black's Law Dictionary defines a sunset law as "[a] statute under which a governmental
agency or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally
renewed." Sunset Law, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Yair Listokin,
Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 530 (2008) (advocating for the use of
sunset provisions as a flexible legislative mechanism). See generally AM. ENTER. INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION (1978) (describing

the various reasons for the use of sunset legislation).
10 See Michael Doran, Tax Legislationin the Contemporary U.S. Congress, 67 TAx L. REV.
555, 556 (2014) (noting that the tax particularism that today shows up through extenders
legislation has become a marginal feature of the tax legislative process); Victor Fleischer, Tax
Extenders, 67 TAx L. REV. 613, 613 (2014) (defining "extenders" as "tax breaks scheduled for
repeal").
1 See Michael Doran, IntergenerationalEquity in FiscalPolicyReform, 61 TAX L. REV. 241,
292 (2008) (noting that legislatures should limit the scope of their policymaking to policies
having only temporary effects); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 253 (2009) (arguing that
enactment of temporary-effect, rather than permanent, legislation would promote political
accountability and greater fiscal restraint).
12 See SOFIA RANCHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 10-11 (2014) (noting experimental lawmaking is beneficial in
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that they set an "expiration date" for legislation. 13 The traditional
view is that such measures counter inertia, as they make
deliberation and intentional statutory action necessary to preserve
legislation.
Public choice theorists argue that such measures serve an
alternative,

more sinister purpose.1 4 In their view, temporary

legislation is a tool to extract rents from industry players. 15 It
requires interest groups to constantly seek the approval and favor

times of uncertainty); Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the
Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 303 (1991) (describing a method of experimental
legislation in which the legislature enacts a standing authorization for agencies to implement
experimental rules).
13 While each of these categories portrays different approaches and mechanisms, this
Article will use the terms "expiring legislation" or "temporary legislation" interchangeably to
denote laws that expire on their own after a set period of time. See Jacob E. Gersen,
Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007) (describing temporary legislation
as statutes containing clauses limiting the duration of their validity); see also William G. Gale
& Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553, 1554 (2003) (detailing the
various expiring tax extenders added in the 2001 Bush tax cuts); Elizabeth Garrett,
Accounting for the FederalBudget andIts Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 194-95 (2004)
(providing examples of the effects of sunset provisions on budget rules and fiscal policy
decisions); Manoj Viswanathan, Note, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical
Evaluation and Prescriptionsfor the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656, 658 (2007) (determining
that the effect of tax extenders is to create permanent status through temporary sunsetting
provisions); AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, supranote 9, at 25 (debating the

reasons for sunset legislation).
14 On public choice theory and political rent seeking, see generally Gordon Tullock, The
Theory of Public Choice, in GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY,
GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 3, 3-6 (2002); FRED S. MCCHESNEY,
MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 1-3

(1997); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 117-19 (1979); Dennis C. Mueller, PublicChoice:
A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LITERATURE 395, 396 (1976); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 226 (1967).
15 See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The PoliticalEconomy of Sunset Provisions
in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2006) (describing temporary provisions as "a
legislative panacea to the ills of modern government" and arguing that it is worthwhile for
politicians to keep legislation temporary to continue to receive rent payments); see also
Fleischer, supra note 10, at 624 (claiming that "extenders are bad tax policy" that "enable
gridlock"); Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does
What It Is Supposed to Do (andNo More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1465-66 (1997) (arguing that
public choice theory explains why "legislative incentives" favor "special-interest legislation"
rather than "diffuse interest[s]"); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice andPublic Interest:
A Study of the Legislative Processas Illustratedby Tax Legislationin the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 66-68 (1990) (arguing that one of the main legislative motivations is rent extraction).

1198

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1193

of legislators so as to not lose their support; indeed, there is some
evidence to that effect. 16
However, both the standard narrative and public choice theory
miss a large part of the picture. This Article argues that temporary
legislation results in an inertial force of its own. By applying path
dependence theory to case studies of temporary legislation, this
Article demonstrates how temporary legislation can often
inadvertently become permanent-not through intent or design, but
through the inherent inertial force of such legislation. What public
choice theorists miss, then, is the fact that so much temporary
legislation expires1 or becomes permanent, 18 in contradiction to the
supposed interests of legislators to extract rents.

16

See Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the

Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 62, 63 (1988) (describing how public choice theory "explains
why requiring a group of taxpayers to work together on a common tax minimization scheme
is an effective barrier against the success of the scheme"); Kysar, supra note 15, at 365-66
(discussing the role of interest groups efforts in extending sunset provisions).
17 Some examples of temporary legislation that have expired include, but are not limited
to, laws that date back to the Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801), which
permitted the deportation, fine, or imprisonment of anyone deemed a threat or for publishing
"false, scandalous and malicious writing" against the U.S. government. The Federal Assault
Weapons Ban-which was added as a subsection of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-2000-prohibited the
manufacture, for civilian use, of semi-automatic assault firearms with certain large capacity
ammunition magazines; this ban expired on September 13, 2004. Several of the government
surveillance portions in the USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001)
expired in 2005 per the Act's "sunset" provision and were not reauthorized until 2011. See
PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (extending the
date of the sunset provision). The surveillance portion that lapsed on June 1, 2015 was
restored in the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268, 300, until
December 15, 2019-but it has recently expired again. The Violence Against Women Act of
1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-24, was signed into law by thenPresident Bill Clinton in 1994 and provided government funding to battle and prosecute
violent crimes against women. VAWA was reauthorized a number of times in 2000, 2013, and
most recently 2019, but it expired in February 2019. See VA WA FacesHardRoad Ahead, AM.
B. ASS'N (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental-legislative_
(outlining
work/publications/washingtonletter/august_2020_wl/vawa-update-0820wl/
VAWA's history).
18 See, for example, the Orphan Drug Tax Credit program-a temporary program enacted
in 1983 that ultimately became permanent in 1997-which provides subsidies to orphanstatus drugs and biologics that are intended to treat rare diseases that affect fewer than
200,000 people in the United States. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049,
2053-56 (1983) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2018)). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
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Understanding the inertial power of temporary legislation is
important in its own right. Yet, this Article also offers some first
steps in identifying elements of the utmost importance to the design
of optimal policy today and permanence of temporary legislation. By

recognizing these circumstances, policymakers can better identify
which temporary measures are more likely to become irremovable
fixtures and which will be amenable to future change.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part II explores the rise of
temporary legislation. Legislators use this statutory mechanism to
battle inertia by requiring frequent reassessment of existing law.
Such reexamination allows legislatures to revisit new information,
fine-tune policymaking errors, respond to changes in social or
technological circumstances, and rescind ineffective rules. 19 Some
also believe that temporary legislation increases government
oversight by requiring the reevaluation of policies and programs
and by allowing legislators to collect data before fully committing to
a permanent new policy.20 Alas, as this Part will demonstrate, in
some circumstances temporary legislation-a tool meant to curb

inertia-may inadvertently create its own inertial force.
Part III lays out the elements of path dependence theory that go
well beyond the maxim that "history matters" or that our past
shapes our future. In economics and the social sciences, path
dependence theory categorically focuses on processes of change. 2 1 It
attributes historical sequences to institutional patterns, increasing

&

of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2133 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2018)) reduced
the orphan drug credit rate from 50% to 25%. At the end of the fiscal cliff in 2012, President
Obama signed into law the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126
Stat. 2313, that made 82% of President Bush's tax cuts permanent. See Chye-Ching Huang,
Budget Deal Makes Permanent82 Percent of President Bush's Tax Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET
POL'Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.cbpp.org/research/budget-deal-makespermanent-82-percent-of-president-bushs-tax-cuts.
19 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 529 (claiming that temporary laws may be good
mechanisms for optimal policy because they make policies more reversible and enhance
efficient policymaking in the search for an optimal solution).
20 See, e.g., Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Proceduresand Public Accountability in Sunset
Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 393, 393-96 (1981)
(discussing how temporary legislation was intended to increase legislative oversight but
noting that this mechanism has not always been adequate).
21 See James Mahoney, Path Dependence in HistoricalSociology, 29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507,
507 (2000) (discussing the difference between general historical analysis and path
dependence scholarship).
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returns dispositions, and deterministic properties.22 Identifying

path dependence, therefore, involves tracing a given result back to
reactive sequences-chains of interrelated, unforeseen events.23
This Part concludes that the ability of decisionmakers to break a
certain pattern, and divert from a chosen path, critically depends on
the presence (or lack thereof) of specific dynamics.
Part IV draws insights from and applies path dependence theory
using a case study to demonstrate the inertial force of temporary
legislation. It focuses on a prominent measure in tax law-the
"research credit" provision-that is a temporary measure meant to
encourage research and experimentation using large financial
incentives. 24 Over several decades, this measure faced multiple
lapses, renewals, and retroactive extensions until it finally became
permanent. 25 The path of the research credit followed "critical
junctures" that provided opportunities for lawmakers to choose
between two or more policy options. 26 Once a selection was made, it
created inherent inertial forces via "reactive causal sequences" of
frequent cycles of extension and renewal with dynamics of
"increasing returns" and "positive feedback" that helped entrench
this policy and prevent diversion from the initial choice. 2 7
See infra Part III.
23 In some cases, path-dependence studies focus on "deviant cases" that have rare or unique
outcomes that could not have been predicted otherwise. See Mahoney, supranote 21, at 508
(describing several deviant cases that are commonly studied in path-dependence theory).
24 The research credit, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2018), was added by Section 221 of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47.
25 See infra Appendix; cf. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Lessons in Cyclical FiscalActivism, 48 CONN.
L. REV. 873, 878 (2016) (detailing the historical circumstances of the creation and repeal of
another form of temporary legislation, the Investment Tax Credit).
26 See infra Section III.A; see also Douglas J. Puffert, PathDependence, Network Form, and
Technological Change (arguing that path dependence can be influenced by a priori
determinants such as technology, factor endowments, preferences, and institutions, as well
22

as specific contingent

events), in HISTORY MATTERS: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH,
TECHNOLOGY, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 63 (Timothy W. Guinnane et al. eds., 2004);

Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and
HistoricalAnalysis ("[T]he branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow."),
in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE 19, 28 (Mark Irving

Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997).
27 See infra Part V; see also Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 645-47 (1996) (pointing to the effectiveness and strength of the chosen
pattern as determining the ability to break out of such pattern); Paul Pierson, Increasing
Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000)
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Thereafter, Part V reveals that non-profits and associations that
organize the collective action of constituents (who benefit from the
path) "self-reinforced" that choice (as well as their existence) and
helped curb legal change or diversion from the path.2 8 With these
elements present, the research credit, intended in 1981 to be a
temporary four-year measure, has persisted to the present because
the cost of switching to an alternative has become too high.29
What was meant to be a temporary measure to address a
localized social issue is now the source of large and established
subsidies. Today, almost 18,000 companies collectively receive over
$12.5 billion through the research credit program.3 0 Whether this
policy is effective is not the issue; rather, the main point is that such
a large and consequential program arose due to unintended inertial
forces created by legislation originally designed as a temporary fix.
This Article concludes with some suggestions regarding more
effective ways to use temporary rulemaking whilst circumventing

legislative inertia. Legal scholarship that incorporates path
dependence theory can provide important insights on recent
expiring legislation. 31 It proposes adopting certain mechanisms and

default rules to allow experimentation with expiring provisions
while avoiding statutory constriction through inertia.
(defining positive feedback as the condition in which a path dependence is created within a
polity); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1373-77,
1395 (2001) (exemplifying increasing returns dynamics).
28 See Pierson, supra note 27, at 260 (arguing that organizations have a strong tendency to
persist due to self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes).
29 See Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the EssentialFacilities
Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481,
508 (2007) (describing the ability of increased switching costs to entrench customers); see also
Listokin, supra note 9, at 530 (discussing high constitutional inertia due to the extremely
high "transaction costs" of changing constitutional policy).
30 See SOI Tax Stats - CorporationResearch Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soitax-stats-corporation-research-credit (last updated Sept. 10, 2020) (select Tax Year 2014
under "Table 1: Corporations Claiming a Credit, by Industrial Sector").
31 For a list of current expiring provisions in the tax context, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION,

JCX-1-20, LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2020-2029 (2020),

https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5240; see also Darla Mercado,
These Three Tax Breaks for 2018 Are Still Up in the Air, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2019, 10:10 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/06/congress-has-yet-to-approve-these-valuable-tax-breaksfor-2018.html (naming mortgage insurance, debt forgiveness of foreclosure, and tuition fees
for higher education as temporary legislation that were up for renewal for the 2018 tax year).
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Legislative inertia permeates many areas of the law.3 2 The
staying power of past decisions can go well beyond present-day cost-

benefit analyses. Path dependence theory serves as an important
avenue to explain not only the destiny of a legislative route but also
to potentially open new frontiers of legal research and point our
attention to overlooked paths and sequences. 33 Temporary
legislation is not formed in a void; it is often created when critical
national concerns exerted pressure on legislators to achieve
economic or social outcomes. 34 Yet, once these exigencies are
removed, rules and procedures-as well as organizations that rely
on their existence-may preserve and expand their paths to invite
more participants and increase their returns. These path dynamics
may lock in temporary measures initially designed to prevent
legislative inertia and encourage change, creating unintended
consequences and becoming rooted in our legal system.
II. LEGISLATIVE INERTIA

[Inertia], or innate force of matter, is a power of
resisting, by which every body, as much as in it lies,
endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it
be of rest, or of moving uniformly forward in a right
line. 35
-Isaac

Newton

In physical science, dormant objects and those that move in a
straight line at a constant speed will continue resting or moving

&

32 See, e.g., supranotes 1, 18, 29-31.
33 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOwA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (examining the
common law concept of precedent from a path dependent doctrine); Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of PathDependence in CorporateOwnershipand Governance, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (discussing path dependence theory in relation to initial choices of
incorporation); see also Lim, supra note 29, at 508 (describing the lock-in created when
switching costs from one software to another are too high); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Path Dependencein CorporateContracting:IncreasingReturns, HerdBehaviorand
CognitiveBiases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348 (1996) (exemplifying the use of a contract term
by firms, noting that the more people utilize that term, the greater the benefit from it).
34 See Gersen, supra note 13, at 255-57 (providing examples of important social policies
that came about as a result of temporary legislation).
35 ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA 1 (Andrew Motte trans., Prometheus Books 1995) (1687).
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unless a force interrupts them.36 In the legal context, inertia
describes the preservation of the status quo. 37 Continuity and
evolution are both crucial to the stability of any legal system. 38
Modern law has to be functional as well as responsive to financial
and natural crises.3 9 Changing circumstances may render statutes
inconsistent with new social or economic landscapes. Obsolescent
laws prevent legislatures and courts from harmonizing legal rules
with present-day conditions and the demands of shifting
majorities.4 0 Given continuous demands for legal reform nowadays,
it is worth asking: what causes legislative inertia? Why do various
aspects of the law persist?
A. THE SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE INERTIA

Many facets of inertia reflect a status quo bias that legislatures
must overcome in order to enact a law. 1 In their seminal
manuscript, The Legal Process, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks

36 See, e.g., Christopher Gresov, Heather A. Haveman & Terence A. Oliva, Organizational
Design, Inertia and the Dynamics of Competitive Response, 4 ORG. Sc. 181, 182 (1993)
(describing inertia as the property of a system that continues to move in straight line unless
acted upon by external force).
37 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (2013) (discussing the
effect of automatic enrollment in creating inertia in people's choices and noting that "[i]n view
of the power of inertia and the tendency to procrastinate, people may simply continue with
the status quo"); see also JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 249 (1990) ("The courts are the legal embodiment of political inertia."); Chris William
Sanchirico, Tax Inertia: A General Framework with Specific Application to Contemporary
Business Tax Reform, 69 TAx L. REV. 135, 140 (2016) (describing "tax inertia" as the "tax
considerations that weigh against a decisionmaker's choice to switch from a status quo
investment to an alternative").
38 CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 3.
39 Cf. Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 426 (2011) (exploring
responsive regulation in the tax area and noting the value of deregulatory reforms that follow
principles of responsive regulation).
40 See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, CalabresianSunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1756 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE

AGE OF STATUTES (1982)) ("Anachronistic laws, whether statutory or judicial, must be
eradicated. . . . Consequently, judges should be entitled to rework legislative enactments to
keep them in line with the current social and legal landscape.").
41 For example, take the legal doctrine of stare decisis. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let
Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV.
177, 190-91 (1989) (discussing the obstacles and inertia created by the doctrine).
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argued that lawmakers have a natural inclination to legislative
inaction, as "other measures have a stronger claim on the limited
time and energy of the [legislative] body." 42 They recognized the
perils of attributing "the weight of government inertia on the side of
social inaction rather than of action."43 The U.S. government, in
their opinion, has reached its highest state of development, and the
vested interests that coincide with institutional inertia are already
aiming toward achieving their settled objectives. 44 Taking a
different view, Ronald Dworkin stated that legislative inertia stems
from a lack of sufficient legislative time and priorities. 45 Limited
available time during legislative sessions, he claimed, prohibits
legislatures from passing new laws, even though legislators
acknowledge the need to do so. 46 Similarly, this failure to move
forward results in unsatisfactory consideration of existing statutes.
In his book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Guido
Calabresi professes that over the last half-century, the United
States has gone, from a system governed by the common law,
through a process of "statutorification" by which written laws came
to dominate our legal system. 47 One of the side effects of this
process, he acknowledges, is that legislative inertia became a real
and substantial phenomenon that threatens the integrity of the
law. 48 He declares that we cannot continue "liv[ing] with aging

statutes and rely[ing] on time to render them totally irrelevant."4 9
While updating legislation would be the optimal solution, Calabresi

42 Henry M. Hart Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 1395 (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
43 Id. at 875.
44 See id. at 115 ("[I]n American society all the forces both of vested interest and
institutional inertia which are on the side of maintenance of existing institutions are on the
side also of steadily more effective . . . achievement of their settled objectives.").
45 See Ronald Dworkin, PoliticalJudges and the Rule of Law ("Legislative time is a scarce
resource, to be allocated with some sense of political priorities ... "), in ARGUING ABOUT LAW
193, 200 (Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 2009).
46 See id. ("[I]t may well be that a judicial decision would be overruled if Parliament had
time to pass every law it would like to pass, but will not be overruled because Parliament
does not.").
47 CALABRESI, supranote 1, at 1, 5 ("[W]e have become a nation governed by written laws.").
48 See id. at 34 ("Legislative inertia ...
[is] a fact of life ... ").
49 Id at 80.
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acknowledges that the legislature is not always up to the task.50
Instead, he proposes a theory that empowers the judiciary to defeat
legislative inertia by transferring the burden of upholding an
obsolete law to those seeking to rely on it.51 Namely, he asserts that
courts have better interpretative tools than legislatures for reading
statutes in a manner consistent with the current legal framework. 52
Nevertheless, Calabresi also warns about making legislative
changes too often.53 He argues that if all statutes are reexamined de
novo every so often, it will create imbalance in lawmaking. 54 Too
much change, he worries, will create a statutory modern world with
little continuity. 55 By the same token, Professor Daniel Farber has
determined that legislative inertia is of "fundamental"
importance. 56 He argues that in order to gain the benefits of
stability, we must maintain some degree of "legislative inertia" in
our system.5 7 Accordingly, he proposes that we include statutory
inertia in our search for optimal legislative decisionmaking. 58
Others reiterated this idea, claiming that we should stop treating
legal inertia as a pathology reflecting democracy's malfunction. 59
Some legal scholars that have explored the sources of legislative
inertia have blamed the power of institutional constraints and
5O See id. at 62 (arguing that the legislature is not the proper "institution or body ...
[to]
entrust[] with the job of determining which laws and rules need renovation or
reconsideration"); Nagle, supranote 1, at 1286 (describing Calabresi's approach to legislative
inertia).
61 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 2, 82-90 (explaining his proposed common-law-based,
burden-shifting approach to judicial review of statutes).
52 See id. at 5-6 (arguing that judicial activism is the result of the legislature's incapacity
to keep laws up to date).
53 See id. at 1 (arguing that, as statutes become the primary source of law, courts and
legislatures have reacted to preserve continuity and change in the law).
64 See id. at 60 ("If all statutes and constitutions were to be reexamined de novo every so
often, a totally new balance in lawmaking would be established. . . ").
55 See id. ("Instead of a system designed to achieve continuity and change in a modern,
statutory world, we would have a system that gives us change and little continuity.").
56 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 308 (1989) (describing the benefits of legislative inertia).
67 See id. ("[T]he agenda rules and institutional structures that create legislative inertia
are themselves fundamental to the workings of legislatures. Without these constraints and
constructs, legislatures would be plagued by instability and would be unable to function as
deliberative bodies." (footnote omitted)).
58 See id. ("It is not at all clear that a democratic system could function otherwise.").
59 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 1, at 1389 (asserting the significance of legislative inertia).
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partisan political dynamics for creating blind spots and blockages
in the legislative process.6 0 Others have described legislative
stagnation as deriving from the high costs of legislative change. 6 1
Multiple levels of congressional approval create costs related to
placing an item on the legislative agenda, learning about relevant
issues, and reconciling different opinions on the optimal policy. 62
Surmounting these obstacles and enacting change is not easy. It
requires overcoming a presumption in favor of the existing state of

affairs.6 3 Overcoming this status quo bias involves attending to
competing considerations in a way that is more challenging than
merely protecting the existing state of affairs. 64 The degree of
inertia in the legislative process is extensive, therefore, because
impeding legislation is far less costly than passing it.65
Commentators have identified two main categories of legislative
inertia: priority-driven and coalition-driven. 66 Priority-driven
inertia arises from "the time-consuming nature of the law-making
process" and the need to prioritize the number of changes the
legislature can enact within a legislative session. 67 Legislators have
a packed agenda involving a variety of complex issues. Resolving
these matters requires a large time commitment and policy
expertise. Representatives who seek reelection must devote the
majority of their time and energy to constituency service.

68

This

6o See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 1, at 1282-83 (noting that legislative inertia can "block[]
amendments that have no significant opposition"); Adler, supra note 1, at 472 ("The degree
of inertia in the legislative process is substantial, and it is far easier to block legislation than
to enact it.").
61 Cf. Listokin, supra note 9, at 530 (discussing high constitutional inertia due to the
extremely high "transactioncosts" of changing constitutional policy).
62 See id. at 530-31 (discussing the costs of "multiple levels of [statutory] approval").
63 See id. at 484 ("Policymaking ... often involves the choice between a new policy and the
status quo. Generally, new policies have higher variance in outcomes than existing policies.").
64 See id. at 523 (discussing "status quo bias" as a barrierto new policies).
65 Adler, supra note 1, at 472; cf. also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical
Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 389 n.1 (1988)
("Continuing resolutions are funding devices enacted whenever Congress is unable to pass
one or more of the thirteen regular appropriation bills by the end of the budget cycle.").
66 See Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review, 38 CARDOzo L. REV.
2193, 2209-11 (2017) (describing these two forms of legislative burdens of inertia).
67 d. at 2209-10.
68 See id. at 2210 ("Capacity constraints ...
will mean that there is little reason .. . for
legislative majorities to give priority to rights-based claims which are advanced by a
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leaves little time to devote to considering and leading major
legislative change. 69 Legislators and their aides often lack the
expertise to resolve complicated questions and have only limited
legislative time and resources. 70 Moreover, legislators do not want
to risk alienating more constituents than they befriend by opining
on controversial questions. 71 Their priorities are to support and, at
the right times, to propose new legislation. This provides them with
an institutional power of inertia by refusing to attend sooner to
certain policy problems in need of legislative attention. 72 This power
is especially relevant in cases where legislators inherently cannot
anticipate unintended consequences and future problems that may
develop with the adoption of a proposed law. 73
Aside from exogenous factors that create priority-driven inertia,
coalition-driven inertia involves internal political dynamics. 74 The
more cynical commentators claim that legislators deliberately
choose not to make difficult policy decisions for political reasons. 75
Coalition-driven forms of inertia arise due to the dynamics of

relatively small minority, if those claims do not command strong majority support."); DAVID
R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 116-17 (1974) (discussing the scope of

time and energy devoted to constituency services).
69 See Richard Pierce, InstitutionalAspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 919
(1985) (surveying the different reasons for legislative inertia).
70 See id. (noting representatives have limited time to be prepared and to ensure the
interests of constituents are met).
71

d.

72 See Maxwell L. Stearns, StandingBack from the Forest: Justiciabilityand Social Choice,

83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1319 (1995) ("[L]egislatures are free not to decide issues presented to
them for consideration in the form of bills. In other words, legislatures, unlike courts, have
the institutional power of inertia." (footnote omitted)).
7 See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 720
(1969) (arguing that agency policymakers "must decide many major questions that could not
have been anticipated at the time of the statutory enactment" because of lawmakers' inability
"to write meaningful standards that will be helpful in answering such major questions");
Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1982) (noting situations where Congress was unable "to anticipate
the advent of a major structural innovation").
7" See Dixon, supra note 66, at 2210 ("Coalition-drivenforms of inertia will arise in the
legislative process as a result of . .. the dynamics of competition between political parties.").
7 See Pierce, supra note 69, at 919 ("More cynical observers claim that Congress chooses
not to make hard policy decisions for political reasons.").
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competition between political parties. 76 The desire to appeal to a
broader electoral base inherently promotes inertia by encouraging
politicians to adopt a legislative agenda that does not divide party
members. 77 Accordingly, legislators push aside and assign low
priority to legislative changes that do not enjoy strong majority

support. 78 Michael Perry claims that the "burden of legislative
inertia" involves the difficult task "of capturing the attention of a
sufficient number of legislators, of surviving various institutional
hurdles (such as committee votes), [and] of winning the support of
a majority of legislators" by those seeking either to enact or repeal
a certain law. 79

Legislative inertia substantially limits statutory reform. It can
block legislative change even if "no significant opposition" exists. 80
For example, if a legal rule is up for reauthorization in the future,
coalition- and priority-driven inertia can disincentivize legislative
action. 81 This Article next demonstrates that legislative inertia can
develop in the context of temporary legislation when statutory
reassessment frequently happens. It begins by reflecting on a

number of explanations invoked for the adoption of temporary
legislation instead of a permanent law or mere legislative inaction.
B. A REMEDY AND ITS UNINTENDED PATH

Temporary legislation has provisions that fix the expiration of
the law or regulation within a predetermined period. 82 Such
provisions automatically repeal the legislation when it is no longer
76 See Rosalind Dixon, A DemocraticTheory of ConstitutionalComparison,56 AM. J. COMP.
L. 947, 968 (2008) (discussing coalition-driven inertia); supranote 74.
77 See Dixon, supra note 66, at 2210 ("If party members ...
are divided on an issue, this
can mean that legislative party leaders have an interest in keeping an issue off the legislative
agenda-even in the face of clear demands for legal change .... ").
78 See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the
Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 654-55 (2003) (noting that legislators avoid making
decisions that will displease major constituencies).

79 MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 304 (1988). But see Christopher H.

Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, andPragmatists,87 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1070 (2003) (pointing
to the advantages of inertia "[i]n times of highly divisive environmental politics").
80 Nagle, supranote 1, at 1282-83.
81 See id. at 1282 ("If a statute is coming up for reauthorization in three years, that can
operate as a disincentive against acting to solve a particular problem now.").
82 See supranotes 8-13 and accompanying text.
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necessary because it has fulfilled its purpose or achieved its desired
effect. 83 Prior to its expiration, temporary legislation is subject to
congressional evaluation to extend or repeal it.84 The following
Section will describe how temporary legislation was initially viewed
as a way to improve public administration, tackle excessive
bureaucracy, reverse legislative inertia, manage emergencies, and
lessen regulatory pressures. Thereafter, it will reveal how
unintended consequences ensure that temporary legislation may
not always deliver its goal.
1. Temporary Legislationand its Promise. The idea of temporary
legislation is not new. Thomas Jefferson strongly promoted
legislative dynamism by proposing that all statutes and
constitutions should last no more than nineteen years. 85 In the First
Congress, James Madison proposed that the Impost Act, which
imposed import taxes, should contain an expiration clause. 86 In
their eyes, excessive stagnation and obsolescence were ill-favored,
and the government's role was to balance competing concerns for
continuity and change. 87 American political scientist Theodore Lowi
is considered the "father" of the temporary legislation movement in
regulations, statutes, and agency rules. 88 In his book The End of
83 See, e.g., Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the FederalIncome Tax, 70 U. CHI. L.
REv. 319, 334 (2003) (discussing the efficacy of zero-based budgeting rules as a way to
eliminate ineffective programs); Eyal-Cohen, supranote 25, at 878 (discussing the birth, life,
and death of the investment tax credit as a temporary tax program).
84 See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
85 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789) ("Every constitution
then, [and] every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is
an act of force, [and] not of right."), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382, 385 (Charles
F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979).
86 See Gazette of the United States (May 20, 1789) ("Mr. Madison observed, that it was
incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution . . . to pass a revenue law unlimitted [sic] in
its duration.. .. "), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 676, 676 (Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen
E. Veit eds., Johns Hopkins University Press 1992); see also Caleb Nelson, Originalismand
Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 540 & n.94 (2003) (reviewing the founders'
debates and analyzing their justifications for rejecting the idea of perpetual laws).
87 Nelson, supra note 86, at 541; see also Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the TimeBased Failuresof the CriminalLaw Through a CriminalSunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV.
1327, 1357-58 (2008) (reviewing the letter exchange between Jefferson and Madison
regarding Jefferson's sunset proposal).
88 See Lowi, supra note 9, at 27 (discussing the original intent behind Professor Lowi's idea
of the "tenure of statutes").
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Liberalism, he proposed enacting a "Tenure-of-Statutes Act" that
would put a five- to ten-year termination date on all statutes that
create federal administrative agencies. 89 Lowi believed his reform
proposal furthered "juridical democracy" and combatted "interestgroup liberalism."9 0 He proposed improving government efficiency

and the integrity of laws by limiting the power that interest groups
exerted over administrative agencies. 91 Lowi suggested that a
legislature should routinely obtain a renewed justification for laws
as an agency's termination date approached. 92

However, the idea of enacting expiring legislation was not the
popular consensus. Instead, promoting stability and flexibility was
prioritized through the practice of enacting statutes intended to
persist indefinitely unless actively repealed. 93 Expiring legislation
thereafter emerged as a reaction to general discontent with
unrestrained governmental growth, excessive bureaucracy, and
massive public spending. 94 The use of such legislation spiked during
the early 1970s in response to the unprecedented growth in the
number of administrative agencies and their powers. 95 The mid1970s saw a steep rise in the enactment of expiring legislation at

89 THEODORE J. LOwI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF

PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309 (1969).
901d. at 311 (denoting interest-group liberalism as a public philosophy that creates
clientelism via the broad expansion of public programs such as the New Deal).
91 1d. at 309-13.
92

Id. at 309.

See Kysar, supranote 15, at 350-55 (describing the history of the sunset movement and
noting that legislators in the 1970s who supported agency oversight did not necessarily back
the idea of automatic expiration).
94 See Frank H. Easterbrook, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip K. Howard, Thomas W.
Merrill & Jeffrey S. Sutton, Showcase PanelIV A FederalSunset Law: The FederalistSociety
2011 NationalLawyers Convention, 16 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 339, 341 (2012) (statement of Prof.
Thomas W. Merrill) (discussing Lowi's "tenure of statutes" act idea and how a reform group,
"Common Cause," has seized it and changed it to a sunset laws movement); see also Mark B
Blickle, The NationalSunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J., 209, 210-12 (1985) (noting
that widespread disillusionment with government bureaucracy led to the popularization of
sunset laws).
95 See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 329-30 (1981)
(noting that sunset legislation was a widely supported method to force increased oversight);
Kysar, supranote 15, at 353 ("[Lowi's] ideas became very influential in the mid-to-late 1970s
during a period of fiscal hardships and pervasive doubt about the efficacy of government
programs.").
93
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the state level via laws that were passed in hopes of abolishing
redundant programs and agencies. 96
Notably, scholars have often discussed expiring legislation in the
context of legislative entrenchment as representing a mirror image
of two different approaches. 97 Legislative entrenchment denotes
"the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules that
are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same
form." 98 For example, an entrenching clause could require a
supermajority to repeal a rule, which prevents a later legislature
from rescinding

the statute.

In

a similar

manner,

expiring

legislation prohibits statutes from remaining in force when future
legislatures do nothing or refuse to repeal it.99 The antientrenchment doctrine-which holds that legislatures cannot make
irreversible policies-supports
temporary
mechanism to avert entrenchment.0 0

legislation

as

a

Accordingly, lawmakers viewed temporary legislation as
furthering the principle of separation of powers by limiting the
legislative powers of Congress to shorter periods and mandating

96 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 354 ("By the early 1980s, thirty-five states had adopted
broad sunset laws.").
97 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111
YALE L.J. 1665, 1665-66 (2002) (maintaining that entrenchment is the mirror image of
expiring legislation, thus the anti-entrenchment doctrine is inconsistent with Congress's
undisputed authority to enact temporary laws). But see Listokin, supra note 9, at 535
(explaining, in contrast to Posner and Vermeule, "why entrenchment is barred while sunset
clauses are legitimate from an economic perspective").
98 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1667; see also Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548,
559 (1879) ("Every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with
respect to them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification
which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *90 ("Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent
parliaments bind not.").
99 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1697 (discussing "a handful of congressionally
enacted rules that attempt to control the courts' interpretation of enactments by subsequent
Congresses").
100 See, e.g., John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchmentof OrdinaryLegislation:
A Reply to ProfessorsPosnerand Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1784-85 (2003) ("A sunset
clause frees future legislatures from being constrained even by the existence of a law. The
new legislature in essence gets to decide de novo how to proceed. That is exactly the opposite
of entrenchment, which restricts the ability of a future legislature to decide at all." (footnote
omitted)).
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reconsideration and reapprova. 10 1 They used temporary legislation
to curb legislative inertia by conferring a temporary and dynamic
character to law.10 2 The sustained legitimacy of a rule or a program
depends upon a succeeding legislative decision. Placing temporal
limits and dispositions on a legal rule or agency curbs the duration
of government powers and guarantees more frequent dialogue
between a legislature and its constituents.10 3 By confirming that
laws and rules will be either terminated or reevaluated, expiring
provisions are viewed as improving political accountability and
transparency.10 4 They can avert inertia and status quo bias by
compelling reexamination of inefficient laws.10 5
Harmonizing these ideas, expiring legislation has been used to
restore legislative oversight. All statutes that change the legal
status quo de facto shift the burden of inertia from the enacting
legislature to future legislatures.1 0 6 The operation of temporary
legislation dictates habitual reevaluation.
These periodic
determinations pressure future legislatures to decide by a specific
date whether a particular rule, program, or agency should persist.1 0 7
These evaluations should look into the effects of the legislation and
101 See Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State Experience, 50 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 49, 55-56 (1990) (studying the extent to which states actively utilize and review
expiring legislation and suggesting "[t]he utility of Sunset as a legislative oversight
mechanism").
102 See Doran, supranote 11, at 293 (noting the responsibility of lawmakers to consider how
fiscal policy will affect those in the future, but also that "we have no good answers").
103 Cf. Gersen, supra note 13, at 298 ("The [temporary] legislative form produces both
informational and distributive benefits, which affect the selection of optimal public policy and
the distribution of authority in government.").
104 See Davis, supranote 20, at 406 (concluding that accountability is improved in laws with
expiring provisions).
105 See, e.g., supranote 17 (outlining the assault weapon ban, the Violence Against Women
Act, and the government surveillance portions of the USA PATRIOT ACT as examples of
temporary legislation that expired and were not reauthorized); see also Listokin, supra note
9, at 551 (noting that expiring provisions can prevent inertia in inefficient corporate contract
provisions).
106 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1697 (comparing temporary legislation and
the anti-entrenchment doctrine); Gersen, supra note 13, at 262-63 (discussing temporary
legislation transaction costs and their allocation between current and future legislatures).
107 See Mark D. Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: CongressionalReauthorization of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 853, 854 (1978) ("'Sunset' is the
popular term for a statutory method of forcing a legislature to make a periodic determination
whether to allow a particular program or agency to continue.").
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whether its objectives are being met efficiently. Those requesting an
extension to avoid a technical renewal process bear the burden of
proof to renew the legislation post-expiration. Consequently,
temporary legislation helps balance the need to adapt to rapidly
changing conditions and to maintain the proper legislative
oversight.
Temporary legislation can also be used to modernize the law by
updating obsolete laws or by eradicating redundant ones. Social
practices and perceptions change over time, and what was
considered unacceptable in the past may be commonly
acknowledged today.10 8 For example, federal criminal laws still
prohibit shooting a fish from an airplane,1 09 selling Swiss cheese
with too few holes,110 and consulting with a pirate.1 Temporary
legislation can help maintain the balance between continuity and
change while avoiding errors and obsolescence via reexamination.1 1 2
Laws with expiring provisions prevent a past majority from
perpetuating its dominion by shifting the power to those who oppose

those laws and requiring legislative action, rather than inaction, to
maintain them.1 13 Expiring legislation thereby imposes fiscal and
political costs on future legislatures seeking to preserve the
consequences of the earlier acts. It places the burden of legislative
action "on those who wish to retain" a legal rule "rather than on

See supranote 2 (referring to various sources of over 800 obsolete rules and regulations
that criminalize obscure behavior and are currently still in effect).
109 A
Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (Feb.
1,
2019, 7:08 PM),
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/1091488611269332993
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 742j1(a)(1)).
110A
Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:47 PM),
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/699409673615712256 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333,
343(g) and 21 C.F.R. § 133.195(a)(1)).
111 A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER (Dec.
6, 2015, 7:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay/status/673661122273263616 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1657).
112 See Nathan Cortez, RegulatingDisruptiveInnovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 219
(2014) ("[Temporary legislation] decrease[s] the costs of premature or incorrect regulation by
time-limiting the damage they can inflict.").
113 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 61 ("It ... deprives a past majority of the benefit of
inertia and gives it to those who object to the laws.").
108
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those who wish to modify or destroy it."11 4 That way, inertial forces

might not "serve the dead hand of the past."11 5
Professor Yair Listokin views the practice of expiring provisions
as Congress recognizing that greater flexibility is needed than is the
norm in that policy area. 116 On the other hand, when greater
stability is needed, ordinary statutes seem to achieve that result.11 7
According to Listokin, all policies are, in a way, temporary because
new policies replace them.11 8 Expiring legislation merely decreases
ex ante the cost of changing policies by reversing the law by
default.1 1 9 Temporary laws make policies more reversible in the
search for optimal legislation. Listokin views them as
"unambiguously positive," as they enhance efficient policymaking
while justifying the adoption of policies with negative expected
value. 120 In his opinion, temporary legislation should be encouraged
and used more to allow lawmakers to reduce legislative costs, gain
practical knowledge, and learn about the benefits of a bill before
committing to irreversible costs. 121 Legislators may be more inclined
to adopt temporary legislation and gather more evidence on risks
and effects during the interim period between enactment and
expiration before committing to a permanent new policy. 122
Id. at 60.
Id. at 60, 62 (noting that the expiring legislation mechanism does not guarantee
anachronistic laws will not get reenacted because "[t]ime does not serve as a good indicator
of age" and noting that "[i]t does not distinguish sufficiently between those [legal rules] in
need of reconsideration because they have become anachronistic and those" that are not).
116 Listokin, supranote 9, at 536.
117 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1672 ("The 'default'-that statutes persist
until repealed-creates a compromise between stability and flexibility, but this balance is
more appropriate for some policy areas than others. Indeed, Congress recognizes as much
when it provides certain statutes with sunset provisions, reflecting the view that greater
flexibility than the norm is needed in that policy area.").
118 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 535 ("In some sense, almost all policies have sunset
clauses-policies automatically lapse when new policies on the same subject are instituted.").
119 See id. ("Sunset clauses therefore enhance the reversibility of policies.").
120 Id. at 536 ("Suppose that there are multiple policies that should be tried in a given order
under the optimal search approach. Passing each of these policies in succession would be
costly.... These costs may well prevent policymakers from choosing policies according to the
optimal search approach's prescriptions.").
114
115

121

Id.

See id. at 533 (discussing the advantage of temporary legislation in the optimal
legislative search process); see also Gersen, supra note 13, at 248 (noting the information
benefits and error costs saved via temporary legislation).
122
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A prominent illustration of this view is the use of temporary
legislation to regulate crises. Wars, natural disasters, and threats
to public order are exigencies that require swift lawmaking. The
most notable type of temporary legislation in such circumstances is
"emergency legislation."

12 3

Emergencies tend to be temporary and

thus necessitate measures that terminate when the exigency ends.
To guarantee the discontinuance of an exceptional rule, temporary
legislation is used to prevent normalization of a state of emergency
and to enable legislatures to return to normalcy. 124 Accordingly,
scholarly literature has viewed the use of temporary legislation as
a good compromise during the suspension of constitutional
protections in light of severe emergencies. 125 It provides a form of
legislative oversight of emergency powers, restrains extraordinary

measures from being standardized, and contributes to building
consensus around potentially controversial measures.
Counterterrorism legislation is a prominent case study of such
temporary legislation. In counterterrorism legislation, an inevitable
tension emerges between democratic process and prompt response
to emergencies. 126 In times of grave national peril, the government

tends to concentrate authority and power to gain control of the
situation. 127 The government may limit fundamental rights
guarantees and enact possibly extreme measures to protect citizens
against perceived severe threats. 128 Temporary emergency

123
124

Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1058 (2004).
See id. at 1037, 1047 (arguing temporary legislation is a good solution to the tension

between the state of emergency and individual constitutional rights); cf. Oren Gross, Chaos
andRules: ShouldResponses to Violent CrisesAlways Be Constitutional?,112 YALE L.J. 1011,
1090 (2003) (noting that emergency legislation may become "normalized and made routine"
and claiming that temporary legislation is not an effective rule to deal with emergencies).
125 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 529-32 (1992) (maintaining that temporary legislation provides a good outlet for
political compromise).
126 Cf. Ackerman, supranote 123, at 1039 ("Terrorist threats do not trigger the existential
rationale, but require the articulation of a different framework for emergency power.").
127 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI.
L. REv. 287, 305 (2008) (discussing the lack of limits on the FBI's new power resulting from
laws enacted in response to the September 11th attacks).
128 See Gross, supra note 124, at 1023 ("[T]here may be circumstances
where the
appropriate method of tackling grave dangers and threats entails going outside the
constitutional order, at times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional principles,
rules, and norms.").
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legislation provides a safeguard and may resolve some of this
tension. 129 Emergency legislation typically expires after a specified

date unless the government renews the legislation or replaces it
with new laws through the normal legislative process. 130 In the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, there has been a
huge increase in the use of temporary legislation to tackle
international terrorism. 131 The USA PATRIOT ACT was passed
swiftly and contained many expiring provisions that supposedly

limited the Act's impact on constitutional rights. 132 This temporary
legislation provided a mechanism to limit the duration of a hastily
adopted law through extraordinary delegation to the executive
branch, to deliver opportunities for gathering empirical data, and to
conduct policy reassessment after a set period. 133
Achieving consensus around contentious legislation is not easy.
Alienated lawmakers and political resistance create high hurdles to
ensure continuity of legal regimes. 134 Temporary legislation
provides opportunities for political haggling and reaching consensus

129 See Ackerman, supra note 123, at 1045 ("Bad legal structures will channel temporary
needs for reassurance into permanent restrictions on liberty; good structures will channel
them into temporary states of emergency, without permanent damage to fundamental
freedoms.").
130 See, e.g., Antonios Kouroutakis & Sofia Ranchordas, Snoozing Democracy: Sunset
Clauses, De-Juridification,andEmergencies, 25 MINN. J. INT'L L. 29, 53 & nn.110-12 (2016)
(citing the United Kingdom Parliament's reasoning for adoption of temporary emergency
legislation).
131 See Emily Berman, The Paradoxof CounterterrorismSunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1777, 1790 (2013) (arguing that the high expectations for post-9/11 counterterrorism
temporary legislation have not been borne out in terms of results).
132 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (including a sunset provision whereby certain provisions of the Act
would "cease to have effect on December 31, 2005").
133 See Berman, supra note 131, at 1824 (describing the enactment of the USA PATRIOT
ACT and noting that the House agreed to vote on the bill "on the condition that it would be
temporary legislation"); John E. Finn, Sunset Clauses andDemocraticDeliberation:Assessing
the Significance of Sunset Provisionsin Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 442, 485 (2010) (reviewing the enactment of the USA PATRIOT ACT, stating that
temporary legislation "appear[s] when there are concerns about the potential abuse of newly
adopted powers and a corresponding desire for legislative oversight").
134 See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of
the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 254-55 (2008) (claiming that expiring legislation is
important for building coalitions in times of political divide).

2021]

UNINTENDED LEGISLATIVE INERTIA

1217

among legislators fearing the potential long-term negative effects of
certain laws. 135 Representatives who oppose a particular law will be
more amenable to passing "erase and rewind" laws that provide
some default assurance that the law will expire and reinstate the
previous

status quo.136

To conclude,

temporary

legislation is

instrumental in reaching political compromise, facilitating
experimentation, gathering information, and assessing risk.
2. Criticism and Increased Inertia. In the past few years,
academics have criticized temporary legislation. They have
condemned the routine extension of temporary legislation without
meaningful evaluation. 137 Instead of expiring after its designated
date, temporary legislation more frequently is extended and
expanded numerous times. 138 Scholars have argued that the
number of expiring provisions is too excessive and that they are
counterproductive, create a disproportional review burden, and
increase statutory uncertainty. 139 Temporary legislation has been
viewed by these scholars as serving primarily as a mechanism to
pressure opponents of a controversial bill to vote in favor of a
temporary version. 14 0 Others have described these laws as

135 See id. at 257 (discussing coalition building for statutes lacking overwhelming support).
136 See Tom
Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian
Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 337 (2014)
(analyzing the political advantages of temporary legislation).
137 See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text.
138 For example, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 has been extended three times
and is currently pending reauthorization. See supra note 17; see also Yin, supra note 11, at
232-33 (reviewing the history of some temporary tax legislation and its repeated extension);
Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1016 (2011) ("Congress
renews the vast majority of [tax] extenders upon the sunset date or shortly thereafter on a
retroactive basis.").
139 See Kysar, supranote 15, at 369, 396 (discussing negative consequences of temporary
tax legislation).
140 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 809, 827 (2019) ("The
uncertainty they create disrupts the planning activities of public and private actors,
increasing compliance costs and distorting investment decisions."); Berman, supra note 131,
at 1824 ("Compromises are therefore easier to reach for legislation with a sunset than for
long-term legislation."). But see Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal
Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 562 (2007) ("Sunset clauses, providing for automatic
repeal of the statute, sometimes indicate that Congress is uncertain whether a statute will
be beneficial.").
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"democracy snooze buttons." 141 Instead of countering legislative
obsolescence, temporary legislation postpones the decisions to a
later date. 142
Expiring legislation has also been described as inefficient,
expensive, and contributing to standardizing extraordinary
measures. 143 Many expiring laws have been reauthorized numerous
times so as to have the effect of permanency. 144 The repeated
extensions of counterterrorism and fiscal legislation are classic
examples of temporary laws that became entrenched and that now
receive minimal reexamination. 145 Calabresi warned that without
substantive review, temporary legislation will "defeat itself." 146
Legislators can create legislative procedures (such as acts extending

141 See David A. Fahrenthold, In Congress, Sunset Clausesare Commonly Passedbut Rarely
Followed Through, WASH. POST. (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/incongress-sunset-clauses-are-commonly-passed-but-rarely-followed-through/2012/12/15/9d8e
3ee0-43b5-11e2-8e70-e1993528222d-story.html ("Washington's current crisis reveals that
the sunset clause has become something unintended: democracy's snooze button."); see also
Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore, Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and
Carbon Taxes (criticizing temporary legislation for its effects on democracy), in THE TIMING
OF LAWMAKING 130, 143 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017); cf. Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe
& David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and
Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1975, 2003-04 (2015) (viewing expiring
legislation as a "democratic deficit").
142 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 378 (noting that temporary legislation was "regarded as
inevitable" in budget reconciliation).
143 See Kysar, supra note 138, at 1051-65 (discussing the disadvantages of temporary
legislation); see also Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Processes,43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 874 (2002) (criticizing the use of expiring legislation
as a gimmick to circumvent budget rules).
144 See Kysar, supra note 15, at 379-80 (noting the functional permanency of temporary
tax legislation). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 603-06 (2002) (noting that expiring
legislation can be beneficial in affording frequent examination of rules that the public
considers to be the status quo).
145 See Gross, supra note 124, at 1090-91 (noting that expiring legislation increases the
risk of normalizing emergency legislation); see also Berman, supranote 131, at 1781 (arguing
that expiring legislation is inappropriate for dealing with terrorist threats because the
reconsideration is not substantial and is not made with fully informed policy).
146 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 61-62 ("[W]e would be right back
where we started,
with obsolete laws being automatically reenacted under a special procedure, much as today
some fiscal statutes, which could give an occasion for reconsideration of the programs they
fund, are treated so as to make any substantive review unlikely.").
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numerous sunset provisions in bulk) that treat the periodic
reexamination as a mere formality. 147
Several theories of democracy highlight the significance of
deliberation by legislators and citizens in the political process,
rather than emphasizing the mere aggregation of preferences. 148
Deliberative democracy is important because preferences change
over time. The central problems of democratic government, as
pointed out by the Founders, were the influence of factions (interest
groups) and the self-interested incentives of representatives during
congressional deliberation. 14 9 Accordingly, scholars viewed an
integral part of defending democracy to be opposing political
interests by rebuking the influence of technocratic elites on
legislators.1 5 0 Indeed, scholars have described the interaction
between legislators and interest groups around expiring legislation
as a rent-extracting mechanism. 151 Using public choice theory,
experts have argued that politicians and special interest groups
began using temporary legislation as a "guise" in order to pass bills
that otherwise would not obtain sufficient support. 152
147 See id. at 61 ("[I]t would be but a short step to a legislative procedure that would treat
the periodic reexamination or reenactment as a mere form.").
148 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1692 ("Laws do not (or should not) simply
aggregate preferences; they should emerge from a deliberative process involving citizens and
legislators, in which preferences change in response to argument and experience.").
149 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing how "the multiplicity of interests" and "the multiplicity of sects" can prevent the
concentration of power); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43-45 (1985) (providing a thorough account of the Madisonian ideas
regarding the influence of factions).
150 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL

INTRODUCTION 10-11 (1991) (expressing concern for the influence of political interest groups
on legislators in light of Madisonian ideas).
151 See John W. Lee & W. Eugene Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship, Public Choice, and
Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section 198, the Brownfields Tax Incentive: Carrotor Stick or
JustNever Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 613, 636 (2002) (noting temporary
laws increase legislators' rent-seeking opportunities). For examples of the rent-extracting
issues associated with sunsets, see Kysar, supra note 15, at 339-40; Kysar, supra note 138,
at 1043; Viswanathan, supra note 13, at 680; cf. Gersen, supra note 13, at 285 ("Temporary
measures could produce less rent seeking in the aggregate because the prize for winning a
statute is less valuable.").
152 See Viswanathan, supra note 13, at 658 (arguing that sunsets result from "political
maneuvering" to enact "permanent legislation under the guise of an ostensible expiration
date"); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures

1220

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1193

In the field of tax law, Professor Rebecca Kysar noted that many
sunset clauses were added to the tax code during the George W.
Bush Administration as gadgets to underestimate the real revenue
cost of legislation and fit it within budget constraints. 153 Because
the estimation of revenue costs of permanent tax provisions is too
high for Congress to pass them, temporary provisions are used to
bypass that issue by taking into account only the revenue costs
during the period up until expiration. 154 Alas, the intention remains
to perpetuate this temporary legislation, thus indirectly
circumventing budget constraints. 155
The consensus-gathering feature of expiring legislation has
turned into one of its central points of criticism. 156 Evaluations of

legislation close to the expiration date became too cumbersome,
making the renewal process autogenetic and technical. 157 Some
scholars have viewed temporary legislation as a political shortcut to
the traditional congressional legislative process and as delaying

Distort Our Budget and Our PoliticalProcess, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2010) ("I do not
agree that temporary-effect legislation will reduce the present value of tax subsidies to
legislators angling for campaign contributions when viewed through the prism of 'interestgroup' theory.").
153 See Kysar, supra note 140, at 853 (explaining how the Bush tax cuts were a "fiscal
illusion" because they "would likely be renewed without full accounting of their costs"); Kysar,
supranote 138, at 1040-41 (noting how legislators analyzed costs of legislation outside of the
budget window when considering the Bush tax cuts).
5
1 4 But see Kysar, supra note 138, at 1041 ("[I]nterest groups, constituents, and political
ideology may spur congressional members to heed the full costs of legislation and to downplay
misleading official costs-thus reconciling, to an extent, the accounting differences between
temporary and lasting legislation.").
155 See Kysar, supra note 140, at 854 ("[B]udget rules that Congress created were later
circumvented when Congress found the pressure to deliver legislative benefits too great.");
Kysar, supra note 138, at 1019 ("Reconciliation ... also induces legislators to use sunset
provisions.").
156 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1692 (explaining how sunset provisions only
work when the current Congress can achieve consensus); see also Chris Mooney, A Short
History
of
Sunsets,
LEGAL
AFF.
(Jan.-Feb.
2004),
https://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/story-mooney janfeb04.msp
(criticizing temporary legislation for becoming "a clever political trap").
157 See Kysar, supra note 138, at 1066 (explaining some difficulties with renewal of
temporary legislation); Mooney, supra note 156 (providing an example of how sunset
provisions can trap later legislators into renewal).
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discussions to the moment of expiration. 158 These repeated
extensions with minimal or no reevaluation effectively have
increased legislative inertia. 159 But why has expiring legislation
maintained such strong institutional bias in favor of the temporary
status quo?

While discussing entrenching statutes, Posner and Vermeule
commented in passing that earlier legislatures always have greater
power than later ones by virtue of making policy choices that de
facto become entrenched through path dependence and inertia.16 0
The next Part will delve into the theoretical underpinnings and
dynamic forces encompassing temporary legislation that create

conditions for path dependency and inertia.
III. PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY

Inertia is the final stage in a path dependent sequence, namely a
situation of "lock-in." 161 Yet, path dependence theory entails more
dynamics than just a structural status quo. 162 First, one must
understand this theoretical framework before applying it to the
legal context and, specifically, to temporary legislation.
Previous choices can influence our current selections, regardless
of whether conditions today still warrant them.16 3 The QWERTY

158 See Gersen, supra note 13, at 268 (asserting that "temporary legislation allows longterm policy commitments to be delayed"); Kysar, supra note 138, at 1028 (claiming that the
history of temporary legislation demonstrates the political pressures for spending and tax
cuts lead to manipulation by legislators); see also Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, Policy
Persistence, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 1328 (1999) (noting the significance of status quo bias
as political pressure on legislators builds).
159 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 97, at 1696-97 ("The problem is that any statute
changes the legal status quo and thereby shifts the burden of inertia from the enacting
legislature to future legislatures.").
160 See id. at 1676 ("[U]pstream legislatures always have greater de facto power than
downstream ones, simply by virtue of drawing on a slate that is more nearly blank. They
make policy choices that become entrenched de facto through path dependence and inertia.").
161 See generally S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (defining path dependence and lock-in at length).

162 See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY 70, 77

(1989) (describing "structural inertia" in organizations as involving the comparisons of rates
of change and resistance to structural change).
163 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supranote 161, at 222-23 (discussing the role the past plays
in current economic conditions).
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typewriter is cited as one of the most notable examples of both path
dependence and network effects. 164 Created in 1873, the QWERTY
keyboard layout has been so entrenched by users over the years that
it continues to dominate the market despite the existence of better
layouts. 16 5 This example illustrates a path that has become so
entrenched that the cost of switching to a different route has become
prohibitive.
Scholars have used path dependence theory to explain unique
present-day phenomena. 166 Economist Paul David argued that
understanding the rationale (or lack thereof) for the world around
us is difficult unless we investigate how we arrived at this state. 167
W. Brian Arthur, who developed the modern economic approach to
path dependence, has hypothesized that the theory encompasses
knowledge-based industries with strong externalities. 168 He
describes path dependence as "lock-in through learning" but claims
that small differences in early patterns or "historical events" may
result in path divergence and will often produce large variations in
final outcomes. 169

Identifying path dependence involves tracing a given result back
through a chain of chronicled events that are unforeseen and cannot
164 See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332-36
(1985) (describing the entrenchment of the QWERTY keyboard layout over more efficient
alternatives); William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A ContrarianView, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
577, 580 (1999) (noting the circumstances of the QWERTY typewriter and different
alternatives over the years).
166 See David, supranote 164, at 333-34 (describing the history of the QWERTY typewriter
and other options available throughout the years and why those options were not adopted).

See generally CHARLES E. WELLER, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE TYPEWRITER (1918).
166 See, e.g., Roe, supranote 27, at 644-46 (using the American corporate structure's history

to argue that the possibility of breaking out of a lock-in situation lies in the overall efficiency
and strength of the pattern created in the past); Lim, supra note 29, at 508 ("Consumers
become 'locked in' to the product because of switching costs associated with moving from one
network to another."); see also Maximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in
InternationalCriminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 908 n.369 (2005) ("Path dependence
processes may lock institutions into alternatives that are less efficient or optimal than
others.").
167 See David, supranote 164, at 332 ("[I]t is sometimes not possible to uncover the logic (or
illogic) of the world around us except by understanding how it got that way.").
168 See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
HistoricalEvents, 99 ECON. J. 116, 126 (1989) (describing, for instance, the path dependence
of the nuclear industry).
169

Id. at 126, 128.
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be classified solely based on prior historical conditions. 170 Some of
those cases have unique and unpredictable outcomes. 171 The
following provides some basic definitions of the various elements of
path dependence along with clarifying illustrations. The
scholarship on path dependence recognizes several dominant
dynamics that contribute to the conservation of a route: critical
junctures, reactive sequences, self-reinforcement, increasing
returns, positive feedback, and lock-in. 172
A. REACTIVE SEQUENCES AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES

Does the order and correlation between historical events matter
to the creation of the path? Economist Douglas Puffert claims a
notable characteristic of a path-dependent process is the incidence
of reactive sequences. 173 He states that a process of economic
allocation is considered path dependent when the sequence of
allocations
relies "not only on fundamental,
a priori
determinants .

.

. but also on particular contingent events." 174

&

170 For example, in the Polya urn experiment, two balls-one red and one black-were
placed in a large urn. The experiment proceeded by removing one ball and returning it to the
urn accompanied by an additional ball of the same color. This process was repeated until the
urn was full. The experiment demonstrated that an early draw, although random, had an
increasing effect on the final result. See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 510-11 (describing the
Polya urn experiment).
171 See, e.g., Greg Hill, History, Necessity, andRational Choice Theory, 9 RATIONALITY
Soc'Y 189, 198-200 (1997) (describing an experiment with a "Polya coin" which shows the
effects initial outcomes have on latter ones).
172 See Scott E. Page, PathDependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87, 88 (2006) (identifying conditions
for path dependence in an economy that faces different technological choices).
173 See Puffert, supra note 26, at 63 (discussing how economic allocation is determined by
both initial factors and subsequent contingent events); Douglas Puffert, Path Dependence,
EH.NET, https://eh.net/?s=path+dependence (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) (further describing
path dependency and the effect of subsequent contingent events). Page distinguished between
path dependency and phat dependency. Page, supra note 172, at 89. He claimed that, in a
phat-dependent process, the order of events does not matter. Id. He exemplified the Polya
Process as being phat-dependent and not path-dependent because, in that experiment, the
order in which balls are taken out of the urn does not matter. See id. at 91 ("[O]utcomes in
the . . . Polya Process do not depend on the order of past events. They only depend on the
distribution over those events. Put in the formal language of this paper: the Polya Process is
phat-dependent but not path-dependent.").
174 Puffert, supra note 26, at 63. These determinants include "technology, factor
endowments, preferences, and institutions." Id.

1224

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1193

Reactive sequences are series of causally connected events that
are "reactive," as each occurrence is partly "a reaction to temporally

antecedent
prior steps
difference
dependent
events lies

events." 175 Accordingly, each event is "dependent" on
or occurrences to form the path of an outcome. 176 The
between a reactive sequence with observed pathtrajectory and a simple chain of causally connected
in the historical, critical juncture that set the chain in

motion. 177 In a reactive sequence, early significant events trigger
other events, not by repeating a given pattern, but by initiating a

series of firmly connected reactions and counterreactions. 178 How
can we observe a chain of interconnected occurrences in the
lawmaking context?
The legislative process encompasses several reactive sequences.
For example, representatives sponsor a legislative proposal and

then the bill is assigned to a committee for study. 179 After approval
by the committee, the bill is put to a vote and, if passed by a majority
of the House, moves to the Senate.1 80 In the Senate, the bill is
assigned to another committee, voted on by that committee and, if
passed, prompts the creation of a conference committee of House
and Senate representatives, which reconciles differences between
the two versions of the bill. 18 1 The reconciled bill is brought for final

approval at the House and Senate and for presentation. 182 The
President then has ten days to sign or veto the enrolled bill.18 3 Other
than executive orders, the President cannot sign a bill into effect if

Mahoney, supra note 21, at 509.
176 Id. at 510.
177 See id. (arguing path-dependent processes must have properties of contingency marked
by a process of inherent sequentiality).
178 See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in
Political Processes,
14 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 72, 85 (2000) (claiming that initial disturbances are crucial because
they trigger "action and reaction [that] shift the system in a new direction").
179 See CHARLES W. JOHNSON, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. NO. 108-93, at 8-16
(2003),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-108hdoc93/pdf/CDOC-108hdoc93.pdf
(describing in detail the legislative process in the United States).
180 Id. at 27-38.
181 Id. at 42-45.
182 Id. at 50.
183 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process (last
visited Mar. 12, 2021).
175
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the first event-the proposal to enact it-has not occurred.184 The
presidential veto or signature into law is thus highly dependent on
the success of the preceding stages. Every occurrence in this
reactive sequence is both responsive to previous events and the
cause of subsequent actions. Early incidences in the sequence
matter because a small change can significantly affect how the
sequence unfolds. 185 For example, if the vote on the floor fails, the
rule might be directed to congressional committees for further
deliberation, or it could be abandoned altogether. Temporary
legislation reinforces these observations as each extension is
contingent upon the expiration of the previous one. Moreover,

extensions of provisions scheduled to expire are often "reactive"
because such events are, to a certain degree, unforeseen-especially
during periods of political divide or major legal reform. 186 Yet, not
all temporary legislation is inevitably path dependent.
Spotting reactive sequences is not enough to identify path

dependence. Another important element in the formation of the
entrenched route is the existence of critical junctures. Critical
junctures are moments during which a specific arrangement is
adopted from among at least two or more alternatives. 187 These
crossroads are "critical" because once a specific path is chosen, it is
costly and difficult to return to the initial point when other
alternatives were available. 188
Social scientists utilize counterfactual analysis in evaluating
critical junctures by using thought exercises that envision how
history would have unfolded had an alternative path been chosen. 189
184

See JOHNSON, supra note 179, at 51.

185

See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 8 (1987) ("Tiny differences in

input could quickly become overwhelming differences in output-a phenomenon given the
name 'sensitive dependence on initial conditions."').
186 See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
Mahoney, supranote 21, at 513.
Id.; see also Levi, supranote 26, at 28 ("Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree .... From
the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is
possible to turn around . .. the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to
follow." (footnote omitted)).
189 But see Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin, CounterfactualThought Experiments in World
Politics: Logical, Methodological, and PsychologicalPerspectives ("Social scientists ... have
play in
also long been aware of the pivotal role that counterfactuals
scholarship . . . . Nevertheless, some contemporary historians still sternly warn us to avoid
'what-might-have-been' questions."), in COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD
187
188
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During the period immediately preceding the critical juncture,
various dynamics influence the decision of which path to take.
Counterfactual analysis maintains that if, during that time, the
final result can be easily predicted, then that sequence ought not be
viewed as path dependent.19 0 On the other hand, if the final outcome
is causally connected to the prior conditions, that sequence may be
viewed as path dependent. 91 Such counterfactual exercises can
delineate the importance of a critical juncture by demonstrating
that choosing a different path would prompt a significantly different
result. Yet, oversimplified, far-fetched, imaginary "what-if'
exercises should be avoided. Instead, we should compare only
alternative options that were truly viable and "on the table" at the
time of the critical juncture. How do we get from a critical juncture
to the final outcome? Investigating causal connections requires
consideration of the following other path dynamics.
B. STATUS QUO BIAS THROUGH INCREASING RETURNS AND
POSITIVE FEEDBACK

The term "increasing returns" refers to a condition whereby the
more often a decision or a choice is made, the more prominent its
advantages because of the increasing number of persons that select
that route.19 2 For example, with today's complex technology, we
frequently observe increasing returns as more people choose to
adopt a technological innovation, gain more experience with this
innovation, and help improve its operation.19 3 Accordingly, a notable
effect of path dependence is that a minor benefit or unimportant
lead for certain technology can result in irreversible influences on
the ultimate market allocation of resources. For example, when two
or more smartphone manufacturers (e.g., IBM and Apple) compete
for the same market of potential adopters, trivial actions such as

POLITICS: LOGICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (Philip E.

Tetlock & Aaron Belkin eds., 1996).
190 Mahoney, supranote 21, at 537.
191 Id.

Pierson, supranote 27, at 252-53.
See Arthur, supra note 168, at 116 (exploring the dynamics of allocation under
increasing returns in a context where increasing returns arise naturally through agents
choosing between competing technologies).
192
193
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product launching events may inadvertently give one product a
market advantage over the other, providing exponentially growing
experience as more customers choose that product.1 94 This is an
example of increasing returns.
A similar phenomenon, "positive feedback," denotes positive
externalities formed when the same decision is made by other
individuals. 95 There is an advantage for people whose decision is
the predominant one.1 96 Positive feedback may seem similar to the
dynamics of increasing returns, but it varies mathematically.

197

Increasing returns describes a market in which advantages grow
exponentially as market share increases and more players make the
same choice. 198 Positive feedback implies enhancement of value to
those that already own a product or made a choice. 199 Stated
differently, positive feedback is a small reward given to market
players themselves who previously chose that option.2 00

194 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 161, at 214-15 (noting that the causes of
increasing returns are varied as the cause may be a result of either economies in production
(supply side) or network effects (demand side)).

195

See PAUL PIERSON,

POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 21

(2004) (describing path dependence as "referring to social processes that exhibit positive
feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development").
196 For example, the more consumers use a certain software, the more applications are
written to accompany that software and improve the software's features, which attracts more
users to purchase the software. See Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in
Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 182 (2004) (describing positive feedbacks
created when more users adopt Microsoft Windows software).
197 See Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary
Political Science (noting that what economists call "increasing returns" could generally
describe self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes), in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF
THE DISCIPLINE 693, 699-703 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002); see also Pierson,
supra note 27, at 251 ("For some theorists, increasing returns are the source of path
dependence; for others, they typify only one form of path dependence.").
198 See Pierson, supranote 27, at 252 ("In an increasing returns process, the probability of
further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path. This is because
the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over
time.").
199 See Page, supra note 172, at 88 (explaining that positive feedbacks are like "little
bonuses given to people who already made that choice or who will make that choice in the
future").
200 See id. at 88 (defining positive feedback dynamics in path dependence); Mahoney, supra
note 21, at 511 (providing examples of positive feedback).
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It is worth noting here the differences between positive feedback
and network effects, which are often conflated. Network
externalities, or network effects, is a phenomenon whereby the
value consumers place on goods increases the more others use those
goods. 20 1 Network effects are also referred to as "positive network
externalities" (a term that surely adds to the confusion) or demandside economies of scale, since each additional customer enhances the
value of the network and changes the shape of the demand curve. 20 2
For example, the value of participation in a network of computers
has been observed to grow significantly with the size of the
network. 20 3 Network effects have played a major role in legal
reasoning and discussions in various areas of the law-such as
antitrust law, intellectual property law, corporate law, and contract
law-because they affect the behavior of participants in the
market. 20 4 Alas, positive feedback does not involve being part of a
network

at

all.205

Rather,

the value

of goods

increases

as

Kolasky, supranote 164, at 579.
See id. (claiming that economists have focused primarily on the negatives of network
effects and the ways they may lead to market failure).
203 See id. at 580 ("[P]ositive network effects exist when the utility of the network (and
therefore its value) increases as output grows.").
204 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 481-85 (1998) (detailing the scholarship on network effects in
various areas of the law); see also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 425 (1985) (arguing that if network
effects diminish social welfare, then courts should consider legal doctrines to remedy these
market failures); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects,
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 97-100 (1994) (describing market actors' behavior in hardware/software
markets). Lemley and McGowan named two main types of network effects-actual networks
and virtual networks-that diverge based on the extent to which the goods provide inherent
value to a consumer apart from any network characteristics. Lemley & McGowan, supra, at
488-94. They wrote, "The greater the inherent value of the good relative to any value added
by additional consumers, the less significant the network effect." Id. at 488. "Actual
[n]etworks," as they called them, encompass "products whose entire value lies in facilitating
interactions between a consumer and others who own the product." Id. Examples of products
with actual networks include telephones, fax machines, and language. Id. at 488-89. "Virtual
[n]etworks," on the other hand, provide increased value when there are additional users of
identical or interrelated products. Id. at 491. For example, as more customers use a specific
software and auxiliary applications, existing users benefit from better file sharing and
services. See id. at 491.
205 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 204, at 495 (emphasizing
that "[b]y definition,
[positive effects] do not exhibit network effects").
201

202
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consumption rises, even where goods are not themselves
connected. 20 6 Thus, although positive feedback is similar to network
effects because they both deliver increasing value to participants,
the concepts differ in how that value is added. Apart from positive
feedback, other dynamics are also important in reinforcing a path.
C. SELF-REINFORCEMENT AND LOCK-IN

A "self-reinforcement" sequence can be characterized by
reproduction that strengthens earlier events.207 Self-reinforcement
portrays a condition in which once a decision has been made, it
creates complementary institutions that maintain that path and
reassure its perpetuation. 20 8 Accordingly, in self-reinforcing
sequences, initial strides in a specific path motivate additional,
similar steps such that it becomes difficult to divert from that
path. 209 "Lock-in" portrays a situation in which a decision is
repeated because a sufficient number of market players have
invested resources in, and become reliant upon, that decision. 2 10
Once unforeseen, critical historical events take place, path
dependence is observed through inertial and deterministic causal
patterns. 211 In other words, when processes are set in motion, they
tend to stay on the path that results. This stage has been described
in social science literature as a state of "inertia." 212 In the legislative
context,

inertia

may

ensue

as

temporary

legislation

gets

"entrapped" in a self-reinforcing sequence, making the cost of
deviation from the renewal pattern too high.
206

Id. at 494.

207 See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 516 (discussing the dynamic of self-reinforcement in
path-dependence scholarship).
208 See William J. Aceves, InstitutionalistTheory and InternationalLegal Scholarship, 12
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 227, 246 (1997) (discussing the role of institutions in technological
and market changes (citing Wayne Sandholtz, Institutions and Collective Action: The New
Telecommunications in Western Europe, 45 WORLD POL. 242 (1993))).
209 Mahoney, supranote 21, at 512.
210 See, e.g., Lim, supranote 29, at 510, 542-49 (discussing lock-in in the software industry
where switching costs are often very high).
211 See Mahoney, supra note 21, at 511 ("[P]ath-dependent sequences are marked by
relatively deterministic causal patterns or what can be thought of as 'inertia'-i.e., once
processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend
to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome.").

2121d.
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Self-reinforcement creates dynamics that reproduce a specific
pattern over time. It generates "reactive sequences" that comprise

a chain of reaction and counterreaction as one event causally
prompts the next, eventually leading to lock-in of the path.2 13
Nevertheless, path dependence scholars recognize the possibility of
breaking out of a lock-in situation, depending on the overall
efficiency and strength of the inertial pattern created in the past. 214
Unexpected shocks, they claim, can alter the course of the path. 2 15
Political scientist Paul Pierson has identified four aspects of the
political domain that reinforce path dependence dynamics: (1) the
centrality of collective action, meaning that the viability of
individual political activity depends immensely on the activities of
others and requires positive feedback to assure their support; (2) the
high number of organizations urging representatives to make
commitments, which elevates the cost of departure from past
arrangements; (3) the existence of power asymmetry, which allows
certain actors to force others to bend to their will, making open
political clash pointless; and (4) the complexity and cloudiness of the
political framework. 216 Pierson also presumed that path dependence
in politics places associations at the center of forming institutional
patterns.217 Once adopted, institutional patterns deliver increasing
benefits to current users because they continue to be adopted. This
makes diverting from the selected path difficult, even if alternative

213 See id. at 509 ("Reactive sequences are chains of temporally ordered and causally
connected events."); see, e.g., Andrew Abbott, From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative
Positivism, 20 Soc. METHODS & RES. 428, 445-49 (1992) (reviewing new methods for
analyzing narrative data over time).
214 See Roe, supra note 27, at 643-45 (describing conditions that disconnect a chain of
events); Langer, supra note 166, at 908 & n.369 (exemplifying path dependent dynamics in
adjudication of international criminal law).
215 See Puffert, supra note 26, at 63 ("A process of economic allocation is called path
dependent when the sequence of allocations depends not only on fundamental, a priori
determinants-typically listed as technology, factor endowments, preferences, and
institutions-but also on particular contingent events.").
216 Pierson, supranote 27, at 257-62.
217 See id. at 255 ("[N]ew institutions often entail high fixed or start-up costs, and they
involve considerable learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations.
Established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability
and further development.").
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options exist. 218 Self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective
action processes also mean that organizations are strongly inclined
to remain in place once they are standardized. 219
Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass North has drawn a
correlation between path dependence, institutional change, and
lock-in. 220 He distinguishes between associations and institutions,
describing institutions as "the rules of the game in a society," while
organizations are the market players. 221 Organizations, for the most
part, exert their influence to justify their existence and to stifle
change. 222 This is especially so when they represent one group in
society and are committed not to the general good of all constituents
but only to those they represent. 223 Once created, organizations are
hard to change, and they significantly affect the path of action. 224
Indeed, as will be demonstrated, organizations have had a large
impact in maintaining the path dependence of temporary legislation
in the United States through self-reinforcement dynamics that have
resulted in increased inertia and lock-in. 225 Historical investigation

218

See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY

7 (1994) (using probability theory to show mathematically how a model of increasing returns
works to create a path dependence sequence).
219 See Mahoney, supranote 21, at 508 ("With increasing returns, an institutional patternonce adopted-delivers increasing benefits with its continued adoption, and thus over time it
becomes more and more difficult to transform the pattern or select previously available
options, even if these alternative options would have been more 'efficient."'); Pierson, supra
note 27, at 258-59 ("[D]espite massive social, economic, and political changes over time, selfreinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes mean that organizations
have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalized.").
2 20
See Douglass C. North, The HistoricalEvolution of Polities, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
381, 385 (1994) (describing a paradigm for long-term political and economic change). See
generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 92-104 (1990) (considering the structure of institutions and their impact on
the organizations that operate under them).
221 NORTH, supranote 220, at 3-5.
222 Id. at 5-6.
223 Id.; see also RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 9-11 (1982) (discussing path dependence and evolutionary economics
processes of institutions).
224 See NORTH, supra note 220, at 8 (noting that economic organization gradually evolve
and alter institutional frameworks); see also Pierson, supranote 27, at 259 (arguing that selfreinforcing dynamics associated with collective action result in organizations having a strong
tendency to persist after they are institutionalized).
225 See infra Part V.
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provides a valuable tool for understanding the steps that set a path
into motion. The following case study of a prominent fiscal policy
will illustrate how path dynamics of expiring provisions can become
rooted and inertial.
IV. THE RESEARCH CREDIT AS A CASE STUDY

The creation of the research credit program did not occur in a
vacuum. That route began with the Cold War, which reflected a
critical juncture-a period of worldwide technological competition,
national security and defense anxieties, and increasing military
concerns. 226 With the rise of Soviet scientific prowess, America
experienced a period of self-examination in which it realized it could
lose its technological superiority to the Communist Bloc. During
committee hearings, the director of the National Science
Foundation (NSF) warned about the Soviet Union's growing
scientific power:
[T]he recent evidence of serious challenge to United
States supremacy from the U.S.S.R. has come as a rude
shock to most Americans and has brought about a
period of intensely critical self-examination and
analysis....
...

Whether

by this

means

[the

U.S.S.R.]

can

succeed in [its] expressed ambition to dominate the
world in scientific and technological achievement
remains to be seen. 227

For examples of scholarship studying the Cold War through the lens of critical juncture
and path dependence, see Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical
Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactualsin HistoricalInstitutionalism,59 WORLD
POL. 341, 345 & n.17 (2007) (noting that "[t]he concept of critical junctures has been applied
to a striking variety of topics including . . . the end of the cold war"); Alen Hristov, Historical
InstitutionalismMeets IR: ExplainingPatternsin EUDefence Spending, E-INT'L REL. (Feb. 3,
2019),
https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/03/historical-institutionalism-meets-ir-explainingpatterns-in-eu-defence-spending/ (arguing "that the whole early Cold War - post-Crimea
episode is causally linked through a path dependent sequence of events").
227 Research and Development: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 85th Cong. 5-6 (1958) [hereinafter Research and Development Hearings]
226
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Achieving superiority in technology involved, among other steps,
investment in research facilities and the education of engineers and
scientists. 228 Over a decade after the test of the first nuclear bomb
in Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 1945, the United States undertook
an extensive study into the nation's slowdown in scientific
research. 229 Federal sponsorship of defense- and aerospace-related
research was low compared to that of other nations. 230 Research
universities in the United Stated badly needed more funds directed
toward basic research to support large-scale scientific activities. 231
The Soviet government and its communist centralized bureaucracy
were the main sources of industrial support for Russian research. 232
Representatives from the Congressional Committee on Science and
Astronautics urged the U.S. government to take similar steps. 2 33

(statement of Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director, NSF); see also id. at 2 (statement of Rep. John
W. McCormack) (noting that the purpose of these hearings was to determine whether "our
Federal research and development activities [were] carried on as effectively and as efficiently
as possible" and without "wasteful duplication ... and financial bottlenecks").
228 See id. at 14-15 (statement of Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director, NSF) (noting that the
United States was "lag[ging] behind most other countries" in terms of commitment to and
respect for scientific education).
229 In 1958, the House Government Operations committee conducted an "extensive study"
of the government's research and experimentation activities. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. John
W. McCormack); see also id. at 315-17 (statement of Dr. John Turkevich, Eugene Higgins
Professor of Chemistry, Princeton University) (advocating for greater federal government in
research and education to help the United States win the "science war").
230 See id. at 116-17 (statement of Peter J. Schenk, President, Air Force Ass'n) (arguing
that the United States was "spending far too little" on basic research and military research
and development); id. at 156-58 (statement of Dr. C.C. Furnas, Chancellor of the University
of Buffalo) (comparing the "relative status" and pace of the United States and Soviet Union
in terms of budgetary investment and scientific output); see also STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF

1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) (comparing military and space research expenditures of the
United States to Japan and West Germany in the 1960s and 70s).
231 See Research and Development Hearings, supra note 227, at 160 (statement of Dr. C.C.
Furnas, Chancellor of the University of Buffalo) ("[I]t is necessary and inevitable that major
Federal Government support must be maintained and enlarged if this country is to keep pace
in the world.").
232 See id. at 311 (statement of Dr. John Turkevich, Eugene Higgins Professor
of Chemistry,
Princeton University) ("In the Soviet Union, everything is done by the Government."). They
provided full scholarships for students and offered lower income tax rates, which contributed
to the motivation of scientists to move to or remain in the Soviet Union. Id. at 311-13.
233 See President's 1963 Tax Message: HearingsBefore the H. Ways & Means Comm., 88th
Cong. 2617-20 (1963) [hereinafter President's1963 Tax Message] (statement of Congressman
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Research and development became extremely important as it
related to U.S. defense and weapon systems.
The sluggish rate of private investment in research
disadvantaged the U.S. trade balance with other industrialized
nations. 234 During the 1960s and 1970s, while spending on research
in the United States was in continuous decline, rival countries
created a remarkable upsurge in technological research. 235 Reports
from Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
described the United States as "a state of relative declinepolitically and economically." 236 The United States was about to lose
its standing as one of the world's most innovative countries and
largest exporters of high-technology goods. 237 Concerns about
economic growth and productivity became central in American
public debate. 238 Lagging productivity and sluggish investment
Emilio Q. Daddario) (stressing the importance of research and science to create new products
that would improve the nation's future, security, welfare, and economy).
234 Private research to Gross National Product ratio in 1977 for the United States was 1.5%,
compared with 1. 9 % for Japan and 2.3% for West Germany. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF

1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981); see also President's 1963 Tax Message, supranote 233, at
2618-19 (statement of Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario) (noting that private companyfinanced R&D had been greatly waning); William M. Horne, Jr., Research and Development
Expenditures (pointing to the growing "time lag" of seven years "between the research
expenditures and their payoff in new products and whole new industries"), reprinted in H.
COMM ON WAYS & MEANS, 85TH CONG., 2 COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX

BASE 1115 (Comm. Print 1959).
235 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) (noting a need to reverse
the decline in research activities in the United States relative to other countries).
236 Tax Cut Proposals: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 96th Cong. 1326 (1980)
[hereinafter Tax Cut ProposalsHearing] (statement of John Nesheim, Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l
Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n) (quoting Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry).
237 See id. at 1321 (noting that "[m]ost of America's current and future export strength
depends upon high technology products in which semiconductors are the essential
components" and that '[i]f America loses its technological lead in [the semiconductor]
industry, it will impair our ability to maintain world leadership in commerce and in defense
capability").
238 See, e.g., Walter W. Heller, Shying Away from Recovery, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1975, at
16 (explaining the debate over policy issues like tax cuts and the decisions made by the
Federal Reserve); Christopher S. Wren, Soviet Plansto Cut Economic Lag Behind U.S. by '80,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1976, at 1 (explaining how the Soviet's plans could lead to the Soviet
Union surpassing the United States on several economic fronts).
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ratios led to increased calls for government involvement. 239 The
media reported a growing public fear. 240 Traditional trade remedies
were viewed as ineffective because they did not address inequalities
in international competition. 24 1 Industry associations urged the
U.S. government to step out of its "neutral corner" and provide
effective market incentives to maintain U.S. technological
leadership. 242 Businesspersons requested that Congress help them
compete in the "markets of the future" by investing in research,
improved products, and more efficient production facilities. 243
See Bradley Graham, U.S. Productivity:Golden Days Over, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1978,
at F1 (reporting on a slump of U.S. productivity and noting that government agencies tasked
with addressing the problem are ineffective); Urban C. Lehner, Manager's Journal: U.S.
Productivity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 22 (discussing the efforts of the Assistant
Secretary of Labor to address declining U.S. productivity).
240 See, e.g., Edward P. Foldessy, Banking Industry in America Is FacingOnslaught of New
Foreign Competition, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1978, at 4 (discussing foreign threats to the U.S.
banking sector); James A. Rousmaniere, Jr., Senate Panel Expands Aid ProgramAimed at
Foreign Competition, BALT. SUN, Oct. 4, 1978, at A7 (discussing fears of unemployment
arising from foreign competition); Dan Fisher, PressureMounts on Steel Industry in U.S.:
Foreign Competition, Profit Squeeze Raise Memories of 1960s Problems, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1975, at F1 (discussing fears from the steel industry concerning foreign competition).
241 See, e.g., Richard D. Lyons, Peterson Urges Research Incentives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1972, at 59 (discussing the need for new research and development policies due to increasing
trade imbalances in high-technology goods); Executives Urge Tax Incentives and Cut in U.S.
Budget, but CongressmenDemur, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1974, at 3 (discussing debate among
Congress members as to effective tax policy to address international competition); Robert W.
Tucker, The InternationalStruggle for Power and the Question, "Does Might Make Right?",
WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1977, at A2 ("[T]he prospects for an emergent global community cannot
appear promising today."); Brendan Jones, U.S.-JapanReport Asks FreerTrade, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1974, at 47 (discussing cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to improve
international cooperation).
242 See Tax Cut ProposalsHearing, supranote 236, at 1310-11 (statement
of John Nesheim,
Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n)
("[W]e face a major challenge in this decade from foreign governments ... to maintain
America's technological leadership."); Leonard Silk, The 'Secular Slowdown' Thesis, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1976, at 67 (noting the need to employ new measures to stimulate more
research and development); Richard Foster, Letter to the Editor, ProperSupport for Lagging
R.&D., N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1979, at A22 (noting that a fundamental R&D problem is a long
term investor behavior).
243 President's 1963 Tax Message, supra note 233, at 2601 (statement of The Fountain Pen
& Mech. Pencil Mfrs. Ass'n); see also id. at 2690 (statement of William M. Horne, Jr.,
Chairman, Tax Policy Committee, The Manufacturing Chemists' Ass'n, Inc.) (encouraging the
Kennedy Administration to incentivize industry to adopt new technological equipment); id.
at 2801 (statement of Paul Robbins, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Engineers) (same).
239
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During that period, American culture began to glorify technology as
an American ethos and as a key to achieving a competitive
advantage. More and more people linked technological advances
and investments in research to spurring economic growth. 244
Several routes existed to improve the U.S. position in the
worldwide technological race. Some options included direct and
indirect subsidies for research and development. Foreign
governments already established subsidy models for domestic
technological advancements. For example, during the 1960s and
1970s, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany
provided various tax credits and cash grants to qualifying research
expenditures, including capital outlays for buildings and other
assets. 245

The Japanese

Ministry of International

Trade

and

Industry implemented laws and policies that allowed U.S. firms to
invest in Japan while negotiating patents in return. 246 The
Japanese government directly spent over $250 million on largescale tech programs and various incentives. 24 7 The Japanese
government was not unique. Many other foreign governments

244 See, e.g., Wren, supra note 238 ("The Soviet leadership ...
announced production goals
for 1977 that it hoped would help significantly narrow the Soviet Union's economic gap with
the United States ... "); Tucker, supranote 241 (discussing international cooperation around
modern technologies); Jones, supra note 241 (reporting on statements from economic
development experts that investment in energy development is needed to improve growth).
245 Such subsidies included special depreciation allowances for property devoted to R&D.
See Tax Cut Proposals, supra note 236, at 1626 (statement of The Ass'n of American
Railroads) ("[M]ajor world competitors ... provide much more favorable depreciation
allowances than our own system of taxation. Japan, West Germany, France, Australia, and
Canada provide capital cost allowances permitting the write-off of investments at a rate 2 to
10 times faster than our present law.").
246 This tactic helped Japanese companies such as Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, and

Fujitsu to sustain domestic competition. See JACK BARANSON, THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE TO

U.S. INDUSTRY 40 (1981) (detailing the Japanese license technology approach with foreign
companies compared to domestic competitors).
247 See Tax Cut ProposalsHearing, supra note 236, at 1326 (statement
of John Nesheim,
Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n)
("Over the last four years the Japanese Government spent $250 million on the well publicized
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) program."); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE
JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975, at 16 (1982) (describing

the way Japan imported a great proportion of its technology from the United States).
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provided
research
assistance
to
domestic
technological
advancements that amounted up to $2 billion. 248
Other direct stimuli paths included establishing a military
research and development agency, similar to the Atomic Energy
Commission, that would hire civilian and military scientists in a
mixed organization and report to the Secretary of Defense. 249
Proposals suggested

providing incentives

for private research

expenditures to develop defense weapons. 25 0 Others recommended
stimulating investment in basic research science by providing
incentives to corporations to collaborate with universities on
developing basic research. 251 Legislators and scholars called for not
only reexamination of the support granted for basic and military
research, but also for the ability to translate such research into
economic activity and increased productivity.252
The growing concern for technological competitiveness and the
emerging culture that glorified scientific innovations marked a
critical point in time. Faced with a crossroad, decisionmakers
needed to determine which route to adopt to keep pace with the
worldwide technological race to the top. 253 Among the indirect
alternatives, economists called on changes to taxation to encourage
the broadening of research efforts and more participation by both

&

248 See Tax Cut Proposals Hearing, supra note 236, at 1313 (statement
of John Nesheim,
Corp. Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductor Industry Ass'n)
("The Japanese, and other countries, ... are providing government support in the form of
subsidies and tax incentives to attract the capital needed . . . . As much as two billion dollars
is being spent on this effort ... ").
249 See Research and Development Hearings, supra note 227, at 324 (statement of T.F.
Walkowicz, New York City, Military Research and Development Management) (discussing
"the proposed Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA, in the Department of Defense").
25O Horne, supra note 234, at 1115.
2s1 See Tax Incentives for Exports: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Mgmt.
of the S. Comm. on Fin., 96th Cong. 48, 50 (1979) [hereinafter Tax Incentives for Exports]
(statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy)
(discussing a bill that would provide corporations with basic research credit).
2s2 Destinies for American Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research
Prod. & the Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 96th Cong.
6, 11 (1979) [hereinafter Destinies for American Research] (statements of Rep. Donald Ritter
and Nobel Laureate Dr. Burton Richter, Stanford Linear Accelerator, Stanford University).
2s3 See Michael Homberg, Who Is Leading Innovation? German Computer Policies, the
American Challenge' and the Technological Race of the 1960s and 1970s, MEDIA INACTION
(May
26,
2017),
https://www001.zimt.uni-siegen.de/ojs/index.php/mia/article/view/4/2
(discussing the worldwide technological race to the top).
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the private and public sector. 254 Specifically on the table was the
creation of a temporary research credit shaped after another
temporary provision, as will be explained in the following Section.
A. POSITIVE FEEDBACK FOR A NEW ROUTE

Providing indirect subsidies to stimulate private investment was
not a new idea. The United States already used tax incentives for
similar purposes, such as immediate expensing 255 and the
temporary "investment tax credit." 256 The research tax credit
garnered more positive feedback than previous programs, which
often provided lackluster benefits to constituents. As opposed to
limited government grants, companies did not compete with each
other for the credit as the program had no cap. Thus, the increasing
support for the research credit amplified its advantages as more
knowledge, experience, and involvement promoted that route.
The National Association of Manufacturers
conducted
independent studies on the benefits of capital tax incentives for
economic growth and encouraged the government to provide
additional tax incentives for product development in the form of a
new investment credit focused on research. 257 While the

254 See Gerhard Colm, The Economics of the CurrentFiscalPolicy Proposalsin the United
States, 23 PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 82, 93 (1963) (discussing tax reform measures to broaden
research efforts and market opportunities).
255 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 179, 174 (2018) (providing immediate expensing of capital
expenditures in qualified property and property used for research respectively).
256 See Stanley S. Surrey, FederalTax Policyin the 1960's, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 477, 478 (1966)

("The investment tax credit, designed to encourage investment through an increase in the
rate of return on investment in machinery and equipment and also in cash flow, was
introduced in 1961 and adopted in 1962."). Congress added § 38 to the Internal Revenue Code
to provide a new temporary investment tax credit of seven percent of the cost of qualified
property with at least four years of useful life. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 38, 46(a)(1), 46(c)(2) (Supp.
IV 1958). The credit was limited to 100% of the tax liability up to $25,000, plus 25% of any
tax liability in excess of $25,000. Id. § 46(a)(2). The credit aimed to encourage private
investments in qualified property and to stimulate the modernization of plants and
equipment. See Surrey, supra, at 478 (stating that the credit's purpose was to "provid[e] in
the tax system a solid support for investment in machinery and equipment").
257 See generally NORMAN

B. TURE,

NAT'L ASS'N OF MFRS.,

TAX POLICY, CAPITAL

FORMATION, AND PRODUCTIVITY: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,

reprintedin General Tax Reform: Pub. HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d
Cong. 178 (1973).
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association's overreaching proposal was not enacted into law until
almost a decade later, it planted the idea to repeat the path of
another temporary tax program in years to come. In 1978, Senators

John Danforth (R-MO) and William Bradley (D-NJ) proposed an
investment credit focused on research and development designed
after the general investment credit precursor. 258 They justified
selecting that route by relying on studies that, at the time, predicted
"the positive impact" of such an apparatus on research "spending,

productivity[,] and inflation." 259 The proposed new research credit,
they contended, would offset the ongoing reluctance of many
companies to bear the significant costs of research. 26 0 The new credit
aimed to do for research investment what the investment credit
purportedly did for capital investment-namely to reverse stagnant
research trends. 26 1 Yet, it took over three years for Congress to agree
on a proper route and enact the measure because, among other
possible options, the new research credit came with much
uncertainty and a high price tag. 262

Treasury remained doubtful about the efficacy of yet another
version of the investment credit for two main reasons. 26 3 First and
foremost, a credit imposes a high burden on the U.S. budget, and it
was not clear how Treasury could offset such an expensive tax
expenditure. 264 Second, Treasury officials questioned utilizing the
tax system, rather than direct government funding routes, to spur
research investments. 265 They tried to divert attention to different
258 S. 700, 96th Cong. (1979), reprintedin Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 6.

See Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 54 (statement of Mark Shepherd, Jr.,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Texas Instruments, Inc.) (describing a study).
260 See id. at 53 (noting declining investments in research activity).
2g9

Id.
262 The Finance Subcommittee on Taxation estimated the revenue cost of Senate bill S. 700
261

and its "10 percent investment tax credit for R&D expenditures" to be $1.872 billion in 1980,
$2.227 billion in 1981, $2.516 billion in 1982, $2.767 billion in 1983, and almost $3 billion in
1984. Id. at 47, 50 (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy).
263 See id. at 29 (describing the Treasury Department's doubts about the proposed
investment credit).
264 See id. at 32 ("[I]f we seek to promote investment through a special tax program, the
offsetting revenue cost must be weighed in the balance. To realize the desired economic
objectives, any such tax program must be consistent with continued improvement in the
budget position").
265 See id. at 31-32 ("[T]he direct expenditure alternative may be more efficient.").
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paths by calling on agencies that were more familiar with
administering research activities, such as the NSF or the Commerce
Department, to take on the endeavor of stimulating increased
research efforts. 266
Notable academics, including Nobel Laureate in Physics Dr.

Burton Richter of Stanford University, supported using the new
credit for research. 267 Dr. Richter stressed the importance of
government policies that would encourage people to take more risks,
not just in connection with capital, but also with research. 268 Nobel
Laureate Dr. Melvin Calvin also believed that providing a credit for
research would encourage firms to innovate. 269 Representatives
from the National Academy of Sciences also recommended this path
and emphasized that implementing it instantaneously was critical
because the U.S. tax structure had remained unchanged over the
previous twenty-five years. 270 Likewise, the American Association
for the Advancement of Science endorsed the proposed new research
credit because it believed that it would increase returns for
investors and the attractiveness of research investments. 271
Representatives of nonprofit organizations such as the Midwest
Research Institute, a large research organization that specialized in
environmental research, raved about the bill, noting, "It is exactly

See id. at 32 ("Agencies familiar with research activities such as the [NSF] or the
Commerce Department, would have more expertise in identifying basic research than would
the Internal Revenue Service.").
267 See Destiniesfor American Research, supranote 252, at 70 (statement of Nobel Laureate
Dr. Burton Richter, Stanford Linear Accelerator, Stanford University) ("Maybe you can do
something about tax policy that lets people make a bundle more money if they innovate than
if they go on in the present directions.").
268 See id. ("[I]t seems to me that there clearly is a problem. It is just as advantageous in
the short run to continue in an industry with present technology as it is to really innovate.").
269 See id. at 71 (statement of Nobel Laureate Dr. Melvin Calvin, Chemistry
Department,
University of California, Berkeley) ("[O]ne way of perhaps inducing industry to increase its
rate and take bigger risks is to have some tax way of providing an incentive for them.").
270 See id. at 78 (statement of Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences)
(explaining how it was difficult to blame the lag in innovation on the tax system because it
had remained constant for twenty-five years).
266

271 See WORK

GRP.,

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING JOBS THROUGH THE SUCCESS OF

SMALL, INNOVATIVE BUSINESSES: A REPORT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1978) (advocating for the ability of small firms to deduct the costs
of regulatory compliance and citing to a report on the state of research), reprinted in Tax
Incentives for Exports, supranote 251, at 122 & n.13.
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the kind of help that the Federal Government should be providing
to aid the economy."272
Many businesspersons who had already gained administrative
experience with the current format of the investment credit hoped
to preserve its existing structure and merely expand it to include
research expenditures. 2 73 While the consensus seemed to favor new
incentives, specifically for research, business leaders kept pushing
for utilization of the existing credit structure and expansion of its
application to research activities. 274 Yet, as will be demonstrated

next, the investment credit had a troublesome history that pushed
Congress away from simply adding "research" to its existing ambit.
Much of the backlash the investment credit route received was
due to its unstable lifecycle. During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S.
government utilized the investment credit as part of its "New
Economics" policy and took affirmative fiscal actions to achieve
economic growth while responding to recurring cycles of recession
and recovery. 275 As opposed to the neoclassical economics idea of
free markets adjusted by an invisible hand, 276 New Economics 277
272 Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 226 (statement of John McKelvey,
President, Midwest Research Institute).
271 See id. at 55 (statement of Mark Shepherd, Jr., Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer,
Texas Instruments, Inc.) ("Among many proposals for financial incentives, we feel the most
effective would be based on a change in the investment tax credit.").
274 See id. at 40-41 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Analysis) (noting that the business community argued that "additional tax incentives
for R. & D. would be a 'mere tinkering at the margin"').
275 See Eyal-Cohen, supranote 25, at 878 (detailing the historical circumstances of the birth
and death of the investment credit). The investment credit conceptually relied on New
Economics, Functional Finance, and Neo-Keynesian theories of government manipulation of

market positions. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT

INTEREST AND MONEY 175-77 (1936) (drawing a connection between increasing savings to
more employment and advocating for a better understanding of ways to influence market
demand); GEORGE TERBORGH, THE NEW ECONOMICS 8 (1968) (discussing the New Economics

theory from a critical point of view); Abba P. Lerner, The Essential Propertiesof Interestand
Money, 66 Q.J. ECON. 172, 192 (1952) (advocating the use of monetary and fiscal measures as
an employment policy).
276 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 48-56 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1910) (1776) (discussing the tendency of market prices
to reach natural balance).
277 See, e.g., Franco Modigliani,
The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We Forsake
StabilizationPolicies?, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 3 (1977) (pointing to the effect of "fiscal policy as
the main tool to keep the economy at near full employment").
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Neo-Keynesian

theories of government manipulation of market positions. 279 The
doctrines prescribed increased use of fiscal, 280 monetary, 28 1 and
expenditure policies in a flexible manner 282 to moderate and manage
the economy. 283 They viewed fiscal policy as a flexible tool along with
interchangeable budget position as a form of functional
calibration. 284 Focused on the potential of the economy, 285 the
federal budget began to include statistical calculations and
predictions that allowed economists of the Council of Economic
Advisors to foresee market behavior and respond to it beforehand
via various apparatuses such as tax policy. 286

New Economics shifted the focus from a passive tax policy to a
more active fiscal agenda. Using measures such as the investment
credit, the government anticipated variable budget positions to be

278 See Abba P. Lerner, FunctionalFinance and the FederalDebt, 10 SOC. RES. 38, 38-39
(1943) (explaining how fiscal policy that anticipates outcomes can direct the economy).
279 See generally KEYNES, supra note 275 (demonstrating a mathematical correlation

between increasing savings to increased employment and market demand).
280 See, e.g., SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, ECONOMICS OF THE KENNEDY YEARS AND A LOOK AHEAD
88-97 (1964) (explaining the effect of increasing federal expenditures and tax incentives on
the economy by spurring investments).
281 See, e.g., David Meiselman, The New Economics andMonetaryPolicy, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS
J. 95, 95-97 (1967) (discussing how increasing credit and restricting borrowing can influence
inflation); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of PublicExpenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT.
387, 388 (1954) (noting the importance of government expenditure in economic calculations).
282 See President's 1967 Tax Proposals:HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
90th Cong. 518-24 (1967) [hereinafter President's 1967 Tax Proposals](statement of Joseph
A. Pechman, Dir. of Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution) (discussing flexible tax
policy and stating that tax increases during inflation can reduce spending).
283 See Lerner, supranote 275, at 192 (advocating the use of monetary and fiscal measures
to control inflation and spur economic growth).
284 See TERBORGH, supra note 275, at 8 (discussing the effect of taking certain budget
positions as an economic stabilizer); see also Alvin H. Hansen, Inflation and the New
Economics, CHALLENGE, Nov./Dec. 1966, at 5, 6 (discussing the correlation between monetary
policy and fiscal policy).
285 See Walter W. Heller, Adjusting the "New Economics" to High-Pressure Prosperity (May
1966) (noting how New Economics utilizes the full potential of the economy), reprintedin
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., MANAGING A FULL EMPLOYMENT ECONOMY 8, 9 (1966).
286 See SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, J. ECON. COMM., 90TH CONG., REVENUE SHARING AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES: WHAT FUTURE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM? 1205, 1207-08 (Comm. Print

1967) (discussing models of revenue growth and probable effects of tax policies).
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modified as needed. 287 Consequently, the U.S. government utilized
the investment credit sporadically: suspended it in 1966, reinstated
it in 1967, repealed it in 1969, reinstated it in 1971, increased it in
1975, and rescinded the investment credit altogether in the tax
reform of 1986.288 The investment credit never reappeared despite
many proposals
legislation.289

over

the

years

to

restore

this

temporary

The evaluations of the investment credit's efficacy were, at best,
mixed. 29 0 Many objected to the credit on account of contracyclical
fiscal theory. 291 Critics thought that this path of functional finance
policy relied on speculative forecasts with long time lags. 292 Thus,
287 See Walter W. Heller, What's Right with Economics?, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 24 (1975)
("[G]overnment action to stimulate supply and suppress demand at certain pressure points
in the economy might well pass the test of economic efficiency.").
288 Eyal-Cohen, supra note 25, at 878.
289 Id.
290 Some believed the investment credit was a productive economic tool that helped

businesses obtain capital. See, e.g., Nomination of David A. Stockman: HearingBefore the S.
Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong. 45 (1981) (statement of Senator John Glenn) ("I
think it is one of our more productive economic tools, and I think [investment credits] should
be expanded instead of criticized as leading to lower income and lower employment."). Yet,
Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley Surrey was one of the biggest critics of temporary
provisions, including the investment credit, and the use of the tax system to maneuver the
market using New Economics theory. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni,
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its InternationalDimension, 27 VA. TAX REV.
437, 497 n.194 (2008) (mentioning Surrey's dislike of the investment tax credit as an
expensive and unnecessary expenditure); see also Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on FiscalPolicy of the J. Econ. Comm., 89th Cong. 238 (1966)
[hereinafter Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization](statement of Hon. Stanley S. Surrey,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (expressing skepticism regarding "the economic
effectiveness of temporary individual income tax changes").
291 See Mortimer M. Caplin, Federal Tax Policy
The Need for Reform, 56 GEO. L.J. 880,
895 (1968) (noting many were not accepting of the New Economics theory); Leo J. Raskind,
The FederalReserve System: An Administrative Agency for ContemporaryMonetary Policy?,
35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299, 313 (1966) (questioning the significance of the New Economics
theory).
292 See President's 1967 Tax Proposals, supra note 282, at 598 (statement of Joseph A.
Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution) (predicting a lag of six to
twelve months for economic changes to follow fiscal action); TERBORGH, supra note 275, at
21-22, 97 (noting that the twelve month forecast does not take into account legislative lag of
fiscal actions); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Econometric PolicyEvaluation:A Critique, 1 CARNEGIEROCHESTER CONE. SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 19, 30 (1976) (arguing that econometric estimates

ignore the time it takes to accomplish fiscal action and various other lags affecting taxpayer's
perception).
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there was a buildup of public dislike of "functional finance" policy. 293
The media reported that the scope and magnitude of the chosen
fiscal action was theoretical and subject to various biases. 294 Shortterm forecasting made determining the scope of the fiscal action
extremely uncertain. 29 5 In the midst of this complex account, a new
path took an unusual turn.
B. THE BIRTH OF A NEW TEMPORARY PATH

There were plenty of reactive sequences and critical junctures in
the path of the temporary investment credit. Nevertheless, its onand-off again history, lagging effect, and high budgetary price tag
did not cultivate inertial forces and path dynamics that were strong
enough to maintain its route. Rather, the investment credit was
sought to manipulate and influence market behavior and created
mixed public reaction. 296 The investment credit was viewed as a
failed experiment and a form of direct government intervention in
market forces. 297 A new device disconnected enough from this
See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 25, at 879 ("The failure of the investment credit was greatly
attributed to its complexity, and to a build-up of public disdain for cyclical legislation and
fiscal activism."); Richard A. Musgrave, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory of Public
Finance, 7 J. ECON. LITERATURE 797, 798 (1969) ("When 'functional finance' reintroduced
taxation as a policy tool, it was as an agent of deflation only, with the balanced-budget
theorem the symbol of the both-sides approach." (citation omitted)); Richard J. Cebula, Deficit
Spending, Expectations, and Fiscal Policy Effectiveness, 28 PUB. FIN. 362, 363 (1973)
(discussing Lerner's "functional finance" theory and arguing that hostility towards debt
increases may constrain effective fiscal policy).
294 See Lucas, supra note 292, at 30 ("Insofar as this assumption is false over the sample
period, the econometric estimates are subject to bias."); Meiselman, supra note 281, at 100
(noting there is "essentially no tested knowledge" to be able to assess the merits of the New
Economics' policy proposals).
295 See Lucas,
supra note 292, at 30 ("It should be clear that the forecasting
methods . . . cannot be expected to yield even order-of-magnitude estimates of the effects of
explicitly temporary tax adjustments.").
296 See supranotes 287-295 and accompanying text.
297 See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 25, at 878 (describing the failed arc of the investment
credit). Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley Surrey was one of the biggest critics of the
investment credit and the use of the tax system to maneuver the market using New
Economics theory. See Tax Changesfor Shortrun Stabilization, supra note 290, at 238
(statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (criticizing the
investment credit); Raskind, supra note 291, at 313 (questioning the significance of the New
Economics theory).
293
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unsuccessful policy experiment was needed. At this critical
juncture, the research credit originated as an offshoot of that path.
By the end of the 1970s, the U.S. economy was in a tailspin.
Combined double-digit inflation and unemployment brought a peak
in the "Misery Index." 298 Hopes for a research upsurge became the
panacea for economic recovery at that time. 299 In his State of the
Union message, President Jimmy Carter supported extensive
government action to encourage investments in research
activities.300 The emerging high-tech industry-specifically the

integrated circuits, telecommunications, and computer industriesgreatly facilitated the enactment of the research credit. American
Electronics Association representatives strongly favored a new
research credit as a way to stimulate long-term research growth.3 0 1
The American Marketing Association,3 0 2 leading aerospace
manufacturing companies,3 0 3 and the Semiconductor Industry
Association 3 4 all recommended a similar route.
See

United States Misery Index: How Miserable do you Feel?, U.S. MISERY
(last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (showing
that during the 1960s, the Misery Index averaged 7.1% but rose to an average of 13.3% during
the 1970s).
299 The
Joint Economic Committee stated: "we urge that consideration be given
to . . . broadening investment tax credits to include private [research and development]." The
1979 Economic Report of the President: HearingsBefore the J. Econ. Comm., 96th Cong. 22
(1979) (report of the Williamsburg Assembly on Anti-Inflation Policy).
300 See The State of the Union, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 105 (Jan. 23, 1979) (calling
on Congress "to take other anti-inflation action ... to reassess our Nation's technological
superiority"); The State of the Union, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 140 (Jan. 25, 1979)
(emphasizing that "research and development is an investment in the Nation's future").
301 See Tax Cut Proposals, supra note 236, at 1302 (statement of Herbert M. Dwight,
American Electronics Ass'n) (recommending bills that would encourage research and
development, including a bill providing tax credits).
302 Tax Incentives for Research: A Public Policy Statement by the American Marketing
Association, MARKETING NEWS, June 20, 1975, at 4 (publishing a statement of the National
Task Force on Tax Credits and coming out in favor of a federal tax credit for research).
303 See, e.g., Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 311-25 (statement of John F.
McDonnell, Executive Vice President of the McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (noting that the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation was a leading aerospace manufacturing company that
strongly advocated for creating incentives for research and arguing that it would contribute
to the accomplishment of important national goals).
304 See Tax Cut Proposals, supra note 236, at 1301 (statement of John Nesheim, Corp.
Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductors Industry Ass'n)
(dramatizing the need for the credit stating: "We are ready to go. We have got the ideas, and
the innovations. We need the cash flow.").
298

INDEX, http://www.miseryindex.us/indexbyyear.aspx
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At that critical juncture in 1981, Congress enacted a new
temporary research credit to stimulate private sector research and
development.3 0 5

By

applying

only

to

incremental

research

expenditures, the credit aimed to incentivize increases in research
and development and further expansion of research spending.3 06
The Joint Committee on Taxation explained that the main reason
for the research credit was the temporary need to reverse a decline
in private research activities, which remained at a low, stable level
in real terms in preceding years.3 0 7 But once this route was created,
strong path dependence forces led to corresponding cycles of
extensions. These unique conditions paved the research credit's
unique road. Positive feedback and self-reinforcing dynamics
created strong inertial forces that helped cement that route toward
enactment and future renewals. Industrial associations played a
central role in encouraging Congress to extend, expand, and
perpetuate the research credit program.3 08 In these sequences,

initial strides made it difficult to divert from that path.
C. REACTIVE SEQUENCES OF RENEWALS

Why was the research credit maintained as a temporary
provision over so many years? Much of it was priority-driven

inertia.3 09 First, the temporary label offered budgetary flexibility
and the opportunity to look for offsetting mechanisms to the high

305 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 44F (1982)).
306 Under the program, firms were, and still are, allowed a dollar-for-dollar offset of income
taxes for additional investment in research. 26 U.S.C.
(2018) (stating how to calculate the credit).

§

44F (1982); 26 U.S.C.

§§

38(c), 46

307 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 119 (Comm. Print 1981) ("[T]he 'civilian'
research/GNP ratio for the United States is 1.5 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for Japan
and 2.3 percent for West Germany.").
308 For example, small business tried to expand the new research credit route even further
by making it refundable. See The Role of Small Business in the Nation's Economic Recovery:
HearingBefore the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 97th Cong. 71 (1981) (statement of David
Tonneson, Certified Public Accountant, Tonneson, Mela, Curtin & Co., Wakefield, Mass.)
("[The Smaller Business Association of New England, Inc.] endorses a refundable tax credit
of at least 10 percent against any incremental expenditures for research and development.").
309 See supranotes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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fiscal price tag that came with it.310 Second, the government needed
to evaluate the operation and efficacy of the research credit and
assess whether it indeed stimulated additional research
expenditures or simply rewarded firms for their everyday research
efforts.3 11 Lastly, the research credit was rather complex and
required policy expertise. 312 The periodic review gave legislators
opportunities to appraise the credit, receive input from

constituents, and refine the legislation. 1 3 Yet, the temporary
marker incentivized legislators to "kick the can down the road" and
simply renew this intricate fiscal mechanism rather than terminate
or permanently add it to the U.S. Code.
A path of reactive sequences-casually connected renewals, each
a reaction to a temporally antecedent expiration event-ensued and
created a legislative inertial process of multiple mechanical
extensions. The 1981 Act set the original research credit to expire
at the end of 1985.314 Yet, soon after, the program lapsed in
anticipation of comprehensive reform. Congress made the first
significant set of changes to the original credit in the 1986 reform
(the biggest tax reform to this day), which marked another "critical
juncture" in the history of the temporary legislation.3 15 The 1986
310 See supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
311 See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92039, THE RESEARCH AND

EXPERIMENTATION TAX CREDIT 2-3 (1993) (discussing what led up to the Congressional action
taken on the Research and Experimentation tax credit); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 121

(Comm. Print 1981) (maintaining the temporariness of the credit as a way to test its
efficiency).
312 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 121 (Comm. Print 1981) (noting that the expiring
nature of the law would give Congress the opportunity to assess whether taxpayers and the
IRS were "able accurately to distinguish qualifying research expenditures from nonqualifying
research-related expenditures").
313 In the case of the research credit, it allowed for periodic examination and review of
categories of qualifying research expenditures and base period, as well as controversies
between taxpayers and the IRS. Id.; see BRUMBAUGH, supra note 311, at 2 (discussing
amendments to the research and experimentation tax credit).
314 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47. For
a detailed legislative history of the research credit, see infra Appendix.
315 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2173; see also NONNA
A. NOTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB87010, TAX REFORM EFFECTS 2 (1987) (surveying the

impact of the 1986 reform); Rodger A. Bolling, Surendra P. Agrawal & Thomas G. Hodge, The
Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification or Complication?,39 TAX EXECUTIVE 235, 239 (1987)
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reform was portrayed as revenue-neutral as it lowered the
individual income tax and offset it with increased revenues from the
repeal of many business incentives.3 16 Surprisingly, the 1986
Reform did not repeal the research credit but extended it
retroactively through December 31, 1988.317 While the research
credit survived the far-reaching 1986 Reform, its distant temporary
relative, the investment credit, did not. The reason for abolishing
the investment credit was neutrality.3 18 The investment credit
"favored investment in machines with relatively short useful
lives."3 19 Thus, it encouraged businesses to invest in equipment
rather than other more economically efficient technologies.
The repeal of the investment credit served as an important
turning point for the research credit program. Technology and
innovation assumed a central position in tax policy discourse due to
their assumed contribution to economic development and the rise in
the standard of living. Accordingly, it appears Congress
acknowledged, for the first time, that the culture of research and
experimentation was prioritized over other policies, including the
goal of maintaining tax neutrality. The research credit portrayed
the improved "2.0" model of the investment credit targeting a more
direct, long-term effect on the economy. The choice not to divert
from the research credit's initial path in the 1986 reform
underscored the importance of maintaining a culture of
technological innovation. Once a culture that glorified scientific
("[T]he 1986 Act is the most sweeping tax legislation in the 73-year history of the Internal
Revenue Code.").
316 The main aspects of the 1986 reform included lowering income tax rates and broadening
the tax base by eliminating or restricting deductions, exclusions, and credits. See Ajay K.
Mehrotra & Joseph J. Thorndike, From ProgrammaticReform to Social Science Research:
The National Tax Associationand the PromiseandPerilsof DisciplinaryEncounters, 45 LAW
& SOC'Y REv. 593, 620-21 (2011) (describing the public atmosphere regarding the 1986
reform).
317 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2173 (amending the
credit through 1988). The Tax Reform made the credit part of the general business credit,
thereby subjecting it to a yearly cap. Id. § 231, 100 Stat. at 2173. In addition, it lowered the
credit to 20% and modified the definition of qualified research expenses. Id. The 1986 reform
also created a separate 20% incremental tax credit for corporate expenditures to support basic
research payments to universities and non-profit organizations. Id. § 231, 100 Stat. at 2175.
318 See NOTO, supranote 315, at 5 ("A major reason the investment credit was repealed was
to eliminate its distortions of investment choices.").
319 Id
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research was established, corresponding industrial associations
self-reinforced the path of the research credit program, as the next
Part demonstrates.
V. SELF-REINFORCED INERTIA

The research credit was extended for one more year by the
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988.320 A year later,
the research credit was further prolonged in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, which also made the research credit
more accessible for start-up firms. 32 1 Congress routinely continued
the research credit's temporary inertial route using extensions and
renewals. 322 As this Part will reveal, these reactive sequences
became locked-in and resistant to change through the efforts of
organizations and associations that self-reinforced the program's
expansion. The wide support given to the research credit prior to its
creation did not dwindle but grew and encompassed additional
supporters as its path expanded. New coalitions encouraged shifting
government funds to commercialize science and technology. 323
Organizations delivered positive feedback via collective action and
strong rhetoric to encourage more participants to utilize the

program. The research credit's path perpetuated itself with the
utmost inertial strength.
Accordingly, over the years, the research credit received
bipartisan support in spite of its high budgetary price tag.324 While

-

320 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4007, 102 Stat.
3342, 3652. In addition, it curtailed the benefit to firms by obligating them to reduce their
expensing claimed under § 174 by fifty percent of the combined amount of the credits. See id.
at § 1002(h)(1), 102 Stat. at 3370.
321 Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7110(a)(1)-(c)(3), 103 Stat. 2106, 2322-23 (extending the research
credit from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1990 and providing a special provision for startups).
322 See infra Appendix.
323 See Sheila Slaughter & Gary Rhoades, The Emergence of a Competitiveness Research
and Development Policy Coalition and the Commercialization of Academic Science and
Technology, 21 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 303, 304 (1996) (comparing the historical support
for research granted by the defense and health coalitions).
324 See Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 880
American Research and Competitiveness Act
of 2015
(May
19,
2015),
https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr880r_
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both political parties supported extending the credit, disagreement
between Republicans and Democrats arose often over whether and
how to offset the revenue cost of this expensive measure. 325 No party
dared to repeal a popular apparatus to support "white-coats"

engaged in scientific advancements that drive future economic
growth. 326 Technology and innovation, by that time, were deeply
embedded values in the American culture. Self-reinforcement
dynamics of coalitions, professional organizations, and industrial
associations engaged in paving the path for the research credit and,
once it was created, molded it over the years toward permanency. 327
While such overreaching inertial forces existed in the case of the
research credit, they did not in circumstances surrounding other
temporary legislation, such as the late investment credit. 328
A. NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES
In 1993, the Economic Strategy Institute (ESI), a non-partisan

public policy research organization dedicated to assuring minimal
market distortions, 329 reported to the President that governmentspending priorities should focus on providing more incentives for
private investment in research. 330 ESI also reiterated the
20150519.pdf (rejecting a permanent extension unless the cost will be offset with other
revenue measures).
325 See

GARY

GUENTHER,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

RL31181,

RESEARCH

AND

EXPERIMENTATION TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12-

14 (2008) (describing how Republican leadership retroactively extended the research credit
and certain other preferences through 2009).
326 See Martin A. Sullivan, Research Credit Hits New Heights, No End in Sight, 94 TAX
NOTES 801, 801-03 (2002) (describing the fluctuating regulations on the research credit over
time, and specifically, the shift between the Clinton Administration's regulations and the
Bush Administration's regulations).
327 See id. at 802 (describing the involvement of businesses in advocating for specific
changes in the research credit's regulation with Congress and executives both during the
Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration).
328 For a short list of temporary legislation that did not survive, see supranote 17.
329 See Who We Are, ECON. STRATEGY INST., https://www.econstrat.org/about-us/who-weare (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) ("[ESI] is a private, non-profit, non-partisan public policy
research organization dedicated to assuring that globalization works with market forces to
achieve maximum benefits rather than distorting markets, and imposing costs.").
330 See The 1993 Economic Report of the President: HearingsBefore the J. Econ. Comm.,
103d Cong. 17 (1993) [hereinafter The 1993 Economic Report of the President] (statement of
Lawrence Chimerine, Senior Economic Counselor, DRI/McGraw Hill and Fellow, Economic
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importance of encouraging more public-private partnerships to fund

research

collaboration in government-owned

facilities. 33 1 The

Committee for Economic Development (CED)-a non-partisan,

business-led,

public

policy

organization-prioritized

spending programs during the 1990s.

33 2

federal

While scrutinizing other

programs, CED reaffirmed the research credit, citing studies
showing that technology is a major source of improved living
standards. 333 The CED acknowledged that civilian research
expenditures, as a percent of GNP, had been quite weak during the
last decade. 334 It advocated using the federal deficit to reverse the
low savings rate via the research credit program. 335 Steven A.
Zimmer, a senior economist at the N.Y. Federal Reserve Bank,

discussed the cost of technology capital before the House
Subcommittee on Technology and Competitiveness in 1992.336
Zimmer recounted that firms were disadvantaged when investing
in research projects, which tend to have a higher cost of capital. 337
Thus, in his eyes, a research credit program was important to
eliminate most of such hindrances. 338
Indeed, the periodic expiration of the research credit provided
opportunities

for government

and

industry to

question

and

Strategy Institute) ("R&D ... means providing more incentives for private investment
through more tax credits .... ").
331 See id. at 50 ("Combined public-private investment initiatives could also provide an

&

immediate boost to the economy.").
332 See Investment Incentives and Capital Costs: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Tech.
Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 102d Cong. 25 (1992) [hereinafter
Investment Incentives and CapitalCosts] (statement of William Beeman, Vice President and
Director of Economic Studies, Committee for Economic Development) (describing the
priorities of the CED).
333 See id. at 21, 25 (opposing "fiscal stimulus" but stating that "[i]nadequate investment in
productive physical capital, education and training, and scientific research and technology
have been major contributing factors to the slowdown in the growth of productivity").
334 See id. at 25 (discussing the reasons for "unsatisfactory" economic performance).
335 See id. at 29 (stating that, among other programs, 'CED has placed the highest priority
on . . . [m]easures that encourage research and development").
336 d. at 69 (statement of Steven A. Zimmer, Senior Manager, Warburg Investment
Management International).
337 See id. at 71 (noting that smaller firms "have a tough time supporting the fixed cost of
something like research and development spending").
338 See id. at 72 (claiming that the cost of capital for research and development can be
reduced with an effective tax credit of twenty percent).
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reexamine the program's efficacy. 339 Was the research credit indeed
effective in spurring investments in research that otherwise would
not have occurred? Throughout the years, those in favor, and the
few that criticized the research credit, used various empirical
studies regarding the credit's effectiveness. 340 For example, the U.S.
General Accounting Office published a study concluding that the
credit positively increased research spending. 34 1 The NSF followed
suit, emphasizing the beneficial patterns of amplified research
expenditures in government, civilian, and university sources since
the enactment of the research credit program. 342 Yet, the
339

See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GGD-89-114, TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: THE

RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING 3 (1989)

(concluding that the research credit economically justifies its cost); Martin A. Sullivan, The
Research Credit:A PerfectExample of anImperfect Code, 85 TAX NOTES 128, 130 (1999) (citing
to a list of economists that claim to prove the research credit's efficiency); Philip G. Berger,
Explicit and Implicit Tax Effects of the R&D Tax Credit, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 131, 167 (1993)
(finding that the research credit incentivized additional spending above its cost to the
government); Nick Bloom, Rachel Griffith & John Van Reenen, Do R&D Tax Credits Work?
Evidence from a Panelof Countries 1979-1997, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (2002) (finding that the
research credit is effective in increasing R&D intensity); Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the
R&E Tax Credit to Drive Innovation, Competitiveness and Prosperity,32 J. TECH. TRANSFER
617, 619 (2007) ("[A]lmost all scholarly studies ... have found that the credit is an effective
tool and that at minimum it produces at least one dollar of research for every tax dollar
forgone."); BRONWYN H. HALL, EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX
CREDITS:

CRITICAL

LITERATURE

REVIEW

AND

RESEARCH

DESIGN

24

(1995),

https://eml.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH95%200TArtax.pdf (arguing that the research
credits induce R&D that covers their cost); see also Emily Chasan, CFOs Warn Investors on
Impact of Expired R&D Tax Credit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 5:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CFOB-5087 (reporting that the temporary credit had a
positive effect on the firm's earnings); Joe Harpaz, R&D Tax CreditExpiry RearsIts Head in
Corporate
Earnings
Reports,
FORBES
(May
1,
2014,
1:39
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2014/05/01/rd-tax-credit-expiry-rears-its-head-incorporate-earnings-reports/?sh=4f836e0f5716 (same). But see Robert Eisner, Steven H. Albert
& Martin A. Sullivan, The New Incremental Tax Creditfor R&D: Incentive or Disincentive?,
37 NAT'L TAX J. 171, 181 (1984) (finding no "positive impact" between the research credit and
R&D expenditures).
340 See supranote 339.
341 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GGD-89-114, TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: THE
RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING 3 (1989)

("[E]ach dollar of taxes foregone stimulated between 15 and 36 cents of research spending.").
342 See National Patterns of R&D Resources: 1994,
NAT'L SCI. FOUND.,
https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20150629163238/http://www.nsf. gov/statistics/s2194/hig
hlig3.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021) (quantifying R&D spending in each sector). The NSF
reported that after a long-time stagnation in research expenditures during the 1970s, the
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Congressional Research Service (CRS) challenged the credit's
effectiveness. 343 CRS staff economists doubted whether the program
was the best way to support research: they believed that direct
funding of research projects could be more cost-effective than the
research credit itself. 34 4 Moreover, research conducted by firms
whose research expenditures were shrinking, and were not entitled
to claim the credit, might have been equally valuable to firms that
were eligible to utilize it.345 The CRS maintained that the nonrefundability of the credit restricted its effect to large, established
firms with positive tax liabilities, viewing the multiplicity of
benefits for research as unwarranted. 346
With the commencement of a new century, the growth of ecommerce continued to cultivate the status of scientific
advancements and global technological competitiveness. 347 This
culture was imperative in cementing the inertial path of the
research credit. Representatives across the political spectrum
emphasized the importance of maintaining the U.S. position in

1980s marked a significant increase in industry research expenditures. National Patternsof
R&D Resources: 1994, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/201506281655
18/http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/s2194/conten1.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). In ten years,
private research outlays in 1990 doubled from their 1980 level. National Patternsof R&D
Resources: 1994, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20150629163247/
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/s2194/contenlb.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
34 3 See DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 92-273 E, TAx PROVISIONS EXPIRING
IN 1992, at 3 (1992) (arguing that "a tax credit may not be the best way" for the government
to support research).
344 See id. ("Some have argued that direct funding of research projects may be more cost
effective than the R&E credit.").
345 See GUENTHER, supra note 325, at 20 (finding that the research credit "was most
beneficial to firms whose research intensities had grown since their base periods and least
beneficial to firms whose research intensities had changed little, not at all, or shrunk since
their base periods").
346 Firms were already permitted to use immediate expensing of their research outlays in
the same year those expenses were incurred. Id. at 7.
347 See generally Henry Kissinger, Making a Go of Globalization:ForFree Trade to Work,
Political Imagination Must Match Economic Growth, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1999, at A33
(discussing how to attain economic growth in a time of growing globalization); Ann Scott
Tyson, Should World Wide Web Be a Tax-Free Zone?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 28,
2000), https://www.csmonitor.com/2000/0228/p3s1.html (quoting e-commerce advocates
claiming that a ban on Internet taxes is critical for growth).
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international competition. 348 Policymakers from both parties
believed technology would enable the United States to compete in
the future global market. 349 This ethos facilitated a bipartisan
agreement that maintaining the research credit program was
essential.3 5 0 For example, by the start of a new millennium, House
Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL), Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (DMO), Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), Minority Leader

Tom Daschle (D-SD), Vice President Al Gore (D), and Governor
George W. Bush (R-TX) all endorsed continuing the research credit
and expanding its scope.3 51 The Joint Committee on Taxation
routinely supported extending the research credit program for its
purported benefits in reversing declining research trends. 352 The
Joint Committee even went as far as encouraging legislators to
make the research credit program permanent in order to increase
certainty for firms currently utilizing it.A35
See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, White House andSenate in TradeAccord, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2002, at A30 (discussing Democrats' proposal to provide health insurance subsidies for
workers who lost jobs because of international competition); Sander Levin, Derailing a
Consensus on Trade, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A29 (reporting a House Republican
leadership initiative on a trade bill that handled international trade standards).
s49 See Anne Swardson, A Better Blend of TransatlanticCompetition, WASH. POST, July 2,
2000, at B1 (discussing the EU and U.S. relationship over technological disputes); Bob Davis
& Gerald F. Seib, Technology Will Test a Washington Culture Born in IndustrialAge, WALL
ST. J., May 1, 2000, at Al (citing the President's agenda under the New Economy policy to
break concentration of technological power); Bill Joy, Technology Check, WASH. POST, Apr.
18, 2000, at A29 (suggesting policies to handle rapidly accelerating technological progress).
sso See Investment Incentives and CapitalCosts, supranote 332, at 115 (statement of Peter
Friedman, President, Photonics Imaging, Inc., representing the American Electronics
Association) ("In a business environment where R&D cycles are calculated in years, and
products lives are calculated in months, a permanent [Research and Development Tax Credit]
is essential.").
351 See The Tax Code and the New Economy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 101 (2000) [hereinafter The Tax Code and the
New Economy] (statement of R. Randall Capps, Corporate Tax Director, and General Tax
Counsel, Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Plano, Texas) (noting that these politicians
"have all endorsed the permanent R&D credit").
352 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
348

PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 114-22

(Comm. Print 1999) (advocating for the extension of the research tax credit to encourage
incremental research projects with increased long-term financial risk).
353 See id. at 123 ("A credit of longer duration may more successfully induce additional
research than would a temporary credit, even if the temporary credit is periodically
renewed.").
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B. INDUSTRY LEADERS AND PROFESSIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

Over the years, the path of the research credit became more
stable and harder to divert. 354 Industry leaders and professional
organizations played a key role in sustaining increasing returns and

positive feedback dynamics for repeated extensions of the research
credit program. 355 Their member firms came to rely on the research
subsidy, and as more firms utilized the program, its path
entrenched and expanded. These organizations used three main
justifications for the need to make the research credit permanent:
First, the temporary nature of the program increased its
uncertainty and made relying on it difficult because projects were
multi-year commitments. 356 Managers and decisionmakers needed
assurance that the credit would be available during the upcoming
years as the research would continue. 357 Second, due to their longterm nature, research projects have stretched schedules that
develop over several years. Accordingly, firms faced long lags in
harvesting returns on their research investments compared to
ordinary investments in capital; they demanded stability rather
than the practice of periodically extending the credit for short
periods or allowing it to lapse. 358 Lastly, assuring the research credit
would be available past administrative audit was a big hurdle. The

364 See NORTH, supra note 220, at 100 (describing the interaction between organizations
and institutions (rules and procedures)).
365 See, e.g., Peter Passell, The Tax Creditfor Research andDevelopment: FreeLunch, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at D2 ("[T]he academy is solidly behind the tax credit for research and
development because it offsets what is widely viewed as the systemic failure of free markets
to allocate adequate resources to research and development. Study after study has found that
corporations capture only about half of the gain from in-house innovation, with the rest going
to other businesses or to consumers."); John Markoff, U.S. Planningto Extend Tax Creditfor
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A21 ("While economists have said that the effects of
the tax credit have been diminished because the yearly extensions have made it difficult for
companies to plan, studies have shown that the credit does have a significant effect on the
economy.").
356 See supranote 353.
357

See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE

PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 122-23

(Comm. Print 1999) ("If a taxpayer considers an incremental research project, the lack of
certainty regarding the availability of future credits increases the financial risk of the
expenditure.").
358 See supra note 350.
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credit's temporary nature and transitionary rules increased its
(already high) complexity and its surrounding controversy.3 59 Thus,
managers sought to resolve these major issues while Congress
considered making the credit permanent.
Newspaper articles reinforced these points by noting the
uncertainty and shortage in long-term capital investments in
research.3 60 Congress needed to redesign research incentives to spur
savings over consumption and provide productive investment over
speculation.3 6 i Fortune Magazine published a cover article that

compared the competitiveness of firms in thirteen key industries in
the United States, Japan, and Europe.36 2 The United States was
ranked last in electronics.36 3
The government justified continuing research subsidies under
the claim that the market fails to allocate resources for research
efficiently.3 6 4 This was said to cause the level of private spending on
research to fall short of the amount that is warranted by the social
benefits of research.3 65 Patents that protect developers' investments

359 See Passell, supranote 355 ("The ... uncertainty has made it harder for companies to
forecast their costs, net of credits, on long-term research projects. And while the impact on
private research budges is unclear, uncertainty has probably cut outlays.").
360 See, e.g., supranotes 238-241, 355, 359 and accompanying text.
361 See Executives Urge Tax Incentives and Cut in U.S. Budget, but
Congressmen Demur,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1974, at 3 (describing a potential tax imposed on profits "unless a
concern diverts profits to research and development or capital spending projects").
362 Andrew Kupfer & Jessica Skelly von Brachel, How American Industry Stacks Up,
FORTUNE, Mar. 9, 1992, at 30.
363 See id. (describing the U.S. consumer electronics industry as sinking "[l]ike a rock").
364 See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR R&D AND INNOVATION xi (1984)

("[T]he government seeks to foster innovation by establishing conditions conducive to
innovative activity, . . .R&D provides the scientific and technical advances needed to sustain
rapid rates of innovation."); id. at 10 ("The ... argument favoring governmental funding of
R&D is based on the alleged inadequacy of the R&D carried out by the private sector, mainly
because private businesses are generally unable to retain all the economic benefits of the
R&D that they fund."); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GGD-89-114, TAX POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATION: THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

SPENDING 2 (1989) ("Lawmakers wanted to provide an incentive for businesses to invest in
research because they were concerned about the competitiveness of American firms.").
365 The reason given for such market shortage was that some types of research required
immense sums of capital, were too uncertain, or were difficult to evaluate accurately due to
lack of information or expertise. See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 343, at 3 ("[W]ithout
government support private industry invests less in research than is warranted by society's
needs.").
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in knowledge ultimately expire, and others reproduce the invention
and appropriate part of its return.3 6 6 Accordingly, the total return
to society from research is often greater than the return that accrues
to the firm that originated the investment in research.36 7 This form
of market failure for innovations was said to preclude firms from
undertaking research even though it is warranted by its immense
return to society.36 8

The Semiconductor Industry Association was particularly
conducive in endorsing renewals of the research credit. While doing
so, it self-reinforced its own existence by encouraging more
participation in the program and preserving important benefits to

its members.36 9 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's hightechnology sector continued

to pose the

greatest competitive

challenge to the telecommunications and computer industries. 370 To
ass See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 75
TEx. L. REV. 989, 991 (1997) (providing an overview of the relationship "between the rights of
original developers and the rights of subsequent improvers"); see also A. Samuel Oddi, UnUnified Economic Theories of Patents The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
267, 273-85 (1996) (discussing the various theories on how patent rights serve as incentives
for innovative activity).
367 See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 343, at 3 (explaining that markets "may not function
optimally in the case of research"). On the uncertainty that is involved in innovation, see
Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens of Innovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 978-81 (2016).
368 See BRUMBAUGH, supranote 343, at 3 ("[W]ithout government support private industry
invests less in research than is warranted by society's needs. The shortfall can be important.
The advances in technology spawned by R&D can result in increased productivity-a leading
source of gains in the Nation's standard of living."); see alsoU.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 364, at xi ("The substantial government subsidies provided for research and development
are justified on the grounds that the government should support R&D projects that are
socially desirable but that are unlikely to be funded by private firms."); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
GGD-89-114, TAx POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS STIMULATED
SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING 22 (1989) ("R&E expenditures may generate benefits

to society beyond those realized by companies that make these expenditures. If the activities
encouraged by the credit are more beneficial to society than the activities discouraged by the
additional taxes needed to fund the credit, then the credit is acceptable tax policy.").
369 See Tax Incentives for Exports, supra note 251, at 202 (statement of John Nesheim,
Treasurer, National Semiconductor Corp., Santa Clara, Calif.) ("New products, new
technological innovations and, indeed, whole new industries might well be created as a result
of increased research. . . . [P]roviding an investment tax credit for R. & D. expenditures will
help to make available to U.S. businesses some of the capital which will enable the businesses
to modernize and maintain our all-important technology lead.").
370 Structural differences between the countries' economic environments provided Japan
significant export competitive advantages over the United States and other nations. See U.S.-
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survive, semiconductor companies had to innovate and invest in
high levels of research and development. 371 Yet, such investments,
the Association noted, were highly uncertain, while new facilities
quickly became obsolete. 372 Self-funding was the industry's main
problem. Three quarters of American tech companies' new capital
at that time came from the reinvestment of after-tax earnings. 373
Most companies paid "little or no dividends." 374 They sought tax
reductions to generate new capital to reinvest in new technology
rather than to transfer to investors. 375 Such testimonies and
statements were instrumental in reinforcing the research credit's
path. Congressional representatives acknowledged the challenges
of the semiconductor industry and committed to advocate for
government support of technological research. 376
Consequently, the inertial path of the research credit persisted
vigorously into its second decade of its existence. Congress extended
the research credit in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990377 and the Tax Extension Act of 1991.378 Delegates from the
American Electronics Association (AEA)-a trade association

JapaneseEconomic Relations:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, Fin., & Security
Econ. of the J. Econ. Comm., 97th Cong. 81-82 (1981) [hereinafter U.S.-JapaneseEconomic
Relations] (statement of George Scalise, Senior Vice President, Advanced Micro Devices Inc.,
in Sunnyvale, Calif.) ("[T]hese structural differences constitute the greatest threat to longterm viability of the U.S. industry.").
371 See Tax Cut Proposals, supra note 236, at 1324 (statement of John Nesheim, Corp.
Treasurer, Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. on behalf of the Semiconductors Industry Ass'n) ("In
order to survive, a semiconductor company must innovate and invest for the future. The
industry must support very high levels of research and development.").
372 See id. at 1324 ("[T]he new facilities will be obsolete in just a few years.").
37 Id. at 1332.

374d.
37 See id. ("If Congress would provide us the kinds of incentives through the tax system
that other countries provide ... , we would overcome much of our growing competitive
disadvantages as we seek to retain the U.S. lead in semiconductor technology. More needs to
be done-especially in capital formation and trade policy-and tax reform is needed promptly
in this aggressive, fast moving industry.").
376 See, e.g., U.S.-JapaneseEconomic Relations, supra note 370, at 81 (statement of Rep.
Frederick W. Richmond) ("I ... would like to do everything that we possibly can to help keep
the semiconductor business here in the United States. After all, we invented it; didn't we?").
37 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11402 (a), 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-473 (extending the research credit for one more year).
378 Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 102(a), 105 Stat. 1686, 1686
(extending the research credit for six more months).
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founded in 1943 to represent the technology industry, including
firms like IBM, AT&T, Motorola, and others-testified before the
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. 379 The AEA
delegates reinforced the Association's own existence by claiming
that high-technology companies were being hindered by the shortterm mentality of investors when these companies required longterm capital investments, especially those involving research.3 80
The great uncertainty surrounding long-term research investments

made it virtually impossible to raise large sums of capital. 38 1 The
AEA went on to fault the United States for being "the only country
that does not protect industries which have some strategic value." 382
Three months before its scheduled expiration, the AEA urged
Congress not only to continue the research credit's path but to
expand it. It advocated for the adoption of a permanent and more
aggressive research credit program to prevent American companies

from moving research overseas. 383
Yet, some managers, such as Hewlett Packard, admitted that
they considered the research credit so unusable that they no longer
calculated it into their long-range cost analyses. 384 Similarly,
industry leader George Hatsopoulos-chairman of Thermo-Electron
(today Thermo-Fisher Scientific)-confessed that, for his firm, the
effect of the research credit was like a drop in the sea. 385 While he
appreciated the extra tax savings, he admitted the credit really did

379 See Investment Incentiues and Capital Costs, supra note 332, at 102-17 (statement of
Peter Friedman, President, Photonics Imaging, Inc.) (testifying on behalf of the AEA).
380 See id. at 112 ("Instead of being challenged on how we can bring our R&D to the

marketplace, we are being dismissed by Wall Street . . . because we cannot promise returns
before the next quarterly statement.").
381 See id. (explaining that, for high-tech companies, "it is virtually impossible to raise
money on Wall Street" due to investors' "short-term mentality").
382 Id. at 103.
383 See id. at 113 ("[T]he AEA ... strongly supports tax policies that encourage investment
in R&D and manufacturing."). The AEA advocated for a fifty-percent credit, claiming such an
increase was necessary to ensure the program's effectiveness. Id.
384 See Rick Wartzman, Whether or Not They Benefit, Companies Decry Instability in Tax
Law as a Barrierto Planning,WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A16 (citing managers responding
to the extension of the research credit).
381 See Investment Incentiues and CapitalCosts, supra note 332, at 71 (statement of Steven
A. Zimmer, Senior Manager, Warburg Investment Management Int'l) (stating that he met
with Mr. Hatsopoulos and recorded his reaction).
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not "enter into [the firm's] marginal decision to invest at all."386 The
reasons for that were twofold: First, the credit's small size made it
less relevant to company executives. 387 Second, the credit involved
much uncertainty as a temporary provision. 388 Even if a firm
claimed the credit in one year and included it as a base year for the
future, it could harm the firm in the long run. Therefore, some firms'
decisionmakers disregarded the research credit. Hatsopoulos
proposed to alter the path and provide a five percent credit on total
research spending, which would have far more impact than the
existing incremental twenty percent research credit. 389 He also
supported a refundable research credit.3 90 These proposals did not
gain traction.39 1

During the 1990s, the research credit continued its inertial path
despite its high fiscal price and severe budgetary pressures during
that period.3 9 2 In 1992, President George H.W. Bush vetoed a bill
that included an extension of the research credit for reasons that
had nothing to do with the credit.39 3 President Bush proposed an

386 Id.
387

Id.

388 See id. at 71 ("[He] was worried if he brought it up this year, this year might be included
as a base year for the future and it could hurt them in the long run."); id. at 76 ("Managers
can't be sure how the rules are going to be changed, and additional R&D spending now could
reduce eligibility for credits later.").
389 See id. at 71 (stating that Hatsopoulos said, "[A] 5 percent tax credit on total research
and development spending would have far more impact than an incremental 20 percent
credit").
390 See id. ("Hatsopoulous said that they appreciate any research and development tax
credit ...
").
391 See Jonathan Talley, Note, The Research and Development Tax Credit: Moderately

Effective but Hamperedby Politics, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 77, 80 (2011) ("[N]o Congress
and President have been able to agree on a permanent extension due to the difficulty of
reconciling the revenue cost of a permanent extension with other budget priorities.");
Wartzman, supra note 384 (citing managers' responses to the extension of the research
credit).
392 See Talley, supra note 391, at 79-80 (discussing Congress's trend in the 1990s of
continuously extending the research credit only on yearly bases because of "the difficulty of
reconciling the revenue cost of a permanent extension with other budget priorities").

393 See

GEORGE

BUSH,

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT

OF

THE UNITED

STATES

TRANSMITTING HIS VETO OF H.R. 4210, THE "TAx FAIRNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

ACCELERATION ACT OF 1992," H.R. DOC. NO. 102-206, at 1 (1992) (relaying presidential veto
of the Act because it would increase taxes for "[m]ore than two-thirds of all taxpayers"); see
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economic growth program but claimed that Congress had "produced
partisan, flawed legislation" that would not create incentives for
long-term investment and would increase income taxes for more
than two-thirds of taxpayers. 394 As a result, the research credit
expired on June 30, 1992, and lapsed for the first time, underlining
its temporary nature. But it did not lapse for long. Once the political
crisis was negotiated, so were the terms of the program extension,
and the research credit was retroactively reinstated through June
30, 1995.395 Retroactive renewals are extreme statutory measures,
and their repeated practice in the case of the research credit
emphasizes the ultimate inertial forces that fueled it.396
In his initiative titled "Rebuild America," President Clinton
made it clear that he prioritized support for the high-tech sector by
including an investment program of $17 billion devoted partly to
technology funding for the NSF but mostly to the extension of the
research credit program.3 9 7 President Clinton also put forth a
proposal to bring back the late investment credit again in the form
of a temporary program.39 8 During 1993, the Joint Economic
Committee reported another decline in research investments in the
United States.3 9 9 It warned about a widening gap between U.S.

ECONOMIC GROWTH ACCELERATION ACT OF 1992, H.R. REP. NO. 102-432, at 29 (1992)

(proposing a permanent extension of the research credit).
394 GEORGE BUSH, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
HIS VETO OF H.R. 4210, THE "TAX FAIRNESS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ACCELERATION ACT OF

1992," H.R. DOC. NO. 102-206, at 1 (1992).
395 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1204, 110 Stat. 1755,
1773.
a96 See Kysar, supranote 138, at 1065 ("[R]etroactive renewals create heavy administrative
costs to taxpayers and may even jeopardize financing arrangements.").
397 See The 1993 Economic Reportof the President,supranote 330, at 133 (statement of the
Hon. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers) (describing the Rebuild
America initiative, including the funding for "the [NSF], science, engineering, and technology
grants, ... and extension of the research and development tax credit").
398 See id. at 131 (proposing the tax credit last for approximately two years). The proposal
was meant for businesses with "over $5 million in gross receipts ... on all equipment
investment above 70% of a historical base (a three-year average)." Id. President Clinton
proposed a simpler version of that credit for small business. See Sullivan, supranote 339, at
128 (describing "the proposed $10.5 billion extension of the research credit").
a99 See The 1993 Economic Report of the President, supra note 330, at 5-7 (statement of
Rep. David R. Obey, Chairman, J. Econ. Comm.) (illustrating a decline in public and private
research investment in the United States).
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research outlays compared to the West Germans and Japanese.4 00
The enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(1993 Act) was a response to such concerns, resulting in extending
the research credit retroactively once more until June 30, 1995.401
President Clinton's proposal for the 1993 Act was to make the credit
permanent. 4 2 The House approved and passed the proposal, but the
Senate version of the 1993 Act contained only an extension.4 03
According to scholars, this was a result of political struggle over the
Republican campaign pledge to create a balanced budget. 404
Notwithstanding its irregular extension cycles and, at times, its
utility as a political negotiating tool, the credit's inertial path
steadily continued to build due to its increasing return and positive
feedback dynamics as more companies used it and called for its
permanence.

Congressional delay caused the research credit to expire again
on June 30, 1995. Although small mom-and-pop shops did not use
the program as often as large high-technology firms, Congress
placed the next extension of the research credit in the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996.405 The Act extended the credit
and retroactively reinstated it but only from July 1, 1996, leaving
the first and last one-year gap in the credit's operation since its
inception in 1981. This was a critical juncture that could have ended
the path of the research credit. Yet, the inertial forces that
maintained the credit since its inception continued its route
forward. The reactive sequences of the research credit returned, and
although the credit expired in 1997 and 1998, it was extended

400

Id. at 7.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13111(a)(1), 107 Stat.
312, 420 (extending the research credit from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1995).
402 See BRUMBAUGH, supra note 311, at 4 ("President Clinton's budget proposals that were
announced in 1993 proposed to make the R&E credit permanent.").
403 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13111(a)(1), 107 Stat.
312, 420.
404 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the ErodingBudget Process, 81 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61, 65 (2018) (describing the political circumstances around the enactment of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993).
405 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1204(a), 110 Stat.
1755, 1773 (extending the research credit from July 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997).
401
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retroactively once again by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997406 and
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1998.407 The legislative packages in which
Congress placed the program serve as evidence of the status quo
bias and the length to which legislators went to extend the research
credit's inertial path rather than to let it die. Once more, the credit
expired in 1999 because of coalition-related priorities and political
divide. It was retroactively reinstated and extended until 2004 in
the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999,
which Republicans advanced.40 8 That year, Congress emphasized
extending expiring provisions, such as the research credit, 40 9 and
commentators at that time opined that this political push for the
five-year extension of the research credit was meant to provide
businesspersons certainty. 410

During the years that the credit was due to expire, Congress
introduced a dozen bills to permanently extend the credit.41 1 These
cycles and reactive sequences began with organizations, economists,
and supporters of the credit emphasizing the importance of
technological innovation to the economy.412 Presidential candidates
§ 601(a)(1), 111 Stat. 788, 861
(extending the research credit from May 31, 1997 to June 30, 1998).
40 7
Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1001(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-888
(extending the research credit from June 30, 1998 to June 30, 1999).
408 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-170,
§ 502(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1860, 1919 (extending the credit from June 30, 1999 to June 30, 2004);
see Sullivan, supranote 339, at 128 (briefly discussing the political economy of 1999 around
the research credit and arguing that the extension of the research credit was closer to a "sure
bet" than other options).
409 See, e.g., H.R. 2923, 106th Cong. §§ 101-05 (1999) (providing for a five-year extension of
research credits).
410 See, e.g., John M. Bixler & Ronald D. Aucutt, WashingtonReport, 25
ACTEC NOTES 190,
190 (1999) (describing the "ironies of the 1999 long-term extension of the research credit and
other expiring provisions"); Ryan J. Donmoyer, U.S. Senate Finance Committee Preparesto
Mark Up Extended Extenders Bill, TAx NOTES TODAY (Oct. 21, 1999) (explaining the inclusion
of "special-interest provisions" in order to pass a package renewing expired tax breaks).
411 See GUENTHER, supranote 325, at 31 (illustrating that, in the 110th Congress, twelve
bills were introduced to permanently extend the research credit, and another seven would
have extended it temporarily).
412 See, e.g., id. at 14 ("Beginning in the mid-1990s, a cycle emerged every time the credits
were about to expire. The cycle commences when congressional and business supporters of
the credit issue public statements calling for a permanent extension .... "); Passell, supra
note 355 (pointing to the political consensus of lobbying to advancing the research credit).
406

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
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supported a permanent enactment of the research credit ceding to
the rhetoric focused on high-technology, science, and innovations. 4 1 3
Eventually, for budgetary reasons, Congress preserved the program
but limited its extension to one or two more years. 4 14
The inertial path of the research credit became locked-in-in
cycles of renewal and extensions-because a sufficient number of
market players had invested resources in, and became reliant on,
the program. 4 15 It was simply too costly at this point to revert to any
alternative route such as competitive grants, private-public

collaborations, or the expansion of basic research programs. As time
passed, the research program benefitted from greater positive
feedback. 4 16 The more that constituents used the research credit
subsidy and supported it, the more the program received backing
for its alleged success in spurring additional research. With every
cycle of extension and renewal, the program enjoyed increasing
returns of its path. As more taxpayers claimed the research credit,
their tax professionals became familiar with its intricacies, thus
helping to improve its operation. 4 17 While other programs for direct
funding and research collaborations also competed for the same
government allocation of funding, high switching costs from the
research credit path prioritized it over other alternative options.
Path dependence scholars prescribe that organizations often
exercise their influence to prevent change. 418 When organizations
represent only certain

groups of constituents,

they focus on

413 See, e.g., Joel Kurtzman, A Fed Chairman in Search of His Economic Leviathan, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1992, at A2 ("The Perot plan proposed a bullish-on-business five-year
moratorium on taxes for startup businesses and a permanent research and development tax
credit."); supra note 351.
414 See GUENTHER, supra note 325, at 14 ("[I]n the end, Congress and the President can
agree only on a relatively short extension of the credit, stymied by the difficulty of reconciling
the revenue cost of a permanent extension with their other budget priorities."); GARY
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS,

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, AND POLICY ISSUES 12 (2005) (explaining the "cycle" of credit

expiration and extension).
415 See supranotes 354-355 and accompanying text.
416

See supra Section I.A.

417

See, e.g., supranotes 339-341, infra notes 422-424 and accompanying text.
See generally N

418

orth, supra note 220 (providing an account of political evolution from an institutional
perspective); NORTH, supra note 220, at 92-104 (considering the structure of institutions
(rules) and their impact on the organizations that operate according to them).
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maintaining and reinforcing the path that prioritizes the interests
of that group. 419 During 1997, a new player entered the political
arena when the R&D Credit Coalition (Coalition) was created to join
forces in a cross-industry effort. Although there were already other
coalitions that acted on behalf of technology companies, this
coalition was the first to name itself after, and design its agenda
around, a specific temporary legislation. 420 The Coalition aimed to
ensure that the research credit became permanent. 421 This network
was comprised of over eighty-seven trade and professional
associations; 422 several think tanks, professional networks,
advocacy

and advisory

groups; 42 3 and over

1000 companies,

including major conglomerates such as Microsoft, Apple, and
Oracle. 424

419 See, e.g., Greg Hitt, BusinessesBet Dollars-to-DoughnutsThat Tactics Win Tax Breaks,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2001, at A16 (noting the groups advocating for a permanent extension
of the research credit similar to other nations).
420 See Savings and Investment Provisions in the Administration'sFiscal Year 1998 Budget
Proposal: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th Cong. 263-72 (1997)
[hereinafter Savings and Investment Provisions in the Administration's Fiscal Year 1998
Budget Proposal] (statement of Patrick Brennan, Vice President, Pericom Semiconductor
Corp., San Jose, California; on Behalf of the R&D Credit Coalition) (listing other coalitions
that followed their agenda such as the Savings Coalition of America, the Blue Dog Coalition,
the Family Business Estate Tax Coalition, Silicon Valley Software Industry Coalition, and
Software Industry Coalition).
421 See
R&D
Coalition
Rebranding
Statement,
R&D
COALITION,
https://investinamericasfuture.org/rd-coalition-rebranding-statement/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2021) (stating that the R&D Coalition supports "a fair and robust R&D Tax Credit and
making policymakers aware of the overall importance of research and development
investments to the U.S. economy").
422 See Savings and Investment Provisionsin the Administration'sFiscal Year 1998 Budget
Proposal, supra note 420, at 263-72 (discussing the associations within the R & D Coalition,
such as U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Aerospace Industries Association, National
Association of Manufacturers, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America, and
Semiconductor Industry Association, among others).
423 For a list of think tanks, professional networks, advocacy, and advisory groups-such
as Business Roundtable, Financial Executives International, and Silicon Valley Leadership
Group-who supported the R&D Coalition, see ParticipatingAssociations, R&D CREDIT
COALITION, https://web.archive.org/web/20060719042307/http://www.investinamericasfuture
.org/member-associations.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
424 Other companies-including HP, Texas Instruments, Honeywell, Boeing, Lockheed
Martin Corporation, DuPont, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, and even
motorcycle manufacturer Harley Davidson-participated in the R&D Credit Coalition. See
ParticipatingCompanies, R&D CREDIT COALITION, https://web.archive.org/web/20060422210
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The Coalition strongly reinforced the narrative that
technological competitiveness is an integral part of economic
growth. It advocated for extending and reshaping the rules
governing the research credit. 42 5 It argued that while the research
credit was made temporary so that industry and government could
evaluate its operation, the program had long proven to be an
effective incentive for companies to increase their domestic
research. 426 The Coalition emphasized that the transient nature of
the program and the many gaps in its extension reduced the
program's certainty and incentivizing effect. 427 In 2000, Bill Sample,
Senior Tax Director at Microsoft and Chairman of the Coalition,
testified about growing controversies in the administration of the
research credit. 428 He argued that compliance disagreements were
caused by the Department of the Treasury taking unreasonable
positions during examination, litigation, and the proposed
regulations.429 Congressional representatives reiterated these
concerns about the difficulty of administrating the research credit

408/http://www.investinamericasfuture.org/member-companies.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2021).
425 See Letter from R&D Coalition to the Hon. Bill Thomas, Charles Grassley, Charles
Rangel, & Max Baucus (Feb. 9, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20060721120837/http://
www.investinamericasfuture.org/PDFs/230615.pdf (urging the enactment of a permanent
research credit).
426 See The Tax Code and the New Economy, supra note 351, at 95 (statement of Bill
Sample, Chairman, R&D Credit Coalition, Redmond, Washington, and Senior Director,
Domestic Taxes and Tax Affairs, Microsoft Corporation) ("While it is understandable that the
Congress in 1981 would want to adopt this new credit on a trial basis, the credit has long
since proven . . . to be an excellent investment of government resources to provide an effective
incentive for companies to increase their U.S.-based R&D.").
427 See id. at 100 (stating that, to maximize the program's effectiveness and to sustain
global technological competitiveness, the U.S. research community needs a stable, consistent
research credit).
428

Id. at 93-100.

See id. at 98 (stating that IRS regulations pertaining to research expenditures were
extremely controversial and had increased uncertainty for firms and the IRS during the
process). The Coalition cited litigation to show that courts supported its position and
admonished the IRS for using "positions that were clearly unsupported by the law." Id. at 99;
see, e.g., Tax & Accounting Software Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (N.D.
Okla. 2000) (applying 26 U.S.C. § 41 to software which has been created to be licensed
commercially for the first time).
429
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as a temporary program. 430 Sample highlighted that research
outlays are primarily spent on salaries for engineers, researchers,
and technicians; thus, the benefits derived from successful new
products trickle to higher salaries for employees and a higher
standard of living. 4 31 In 2005, Ernst & Young conducted a study on
behalf of the Coalition that measured the effect of the research
credit on firms that claimed it.432 They found that most companies
utilizing
the
research
credit
were
large,
established
conglomerates. 433 These studies proved that the research credit
program was a meaningful, market-driven tool that allowed firms
to make the choice about the types of products and technology
investments that would heighten their competitiveness in the world
marketplace. 434 Similar studies also posited that "a one-dollar
reduction in the after-tax price of R&D stimulates approximately
one dollar of additional private R&D spending in the short-run, and
about two dollars of additional R&D in the long run."43 5
See The Tax Code and the New Economy, supra note 351, at 98 (statement of Bill
Sample, Chairman, R&D Credit Coalition) ("This reliance by the IRS on proposed rules,
which are subject to further administrative actions, evidences a disregard for the
administrative rulemaking process and inappropriate tax administration of the statutory
provisions of section 41." (quoting a letter from Representatives Johnson and Matsui)).
431 See id. at 97 ("The R&D credit and investment in R&D is ultimately an investment in
people, their education, their jobs, their economic security, and their standard of living.").
430

432

See generally ERNST

& YOUNG LLP, SUPPORTING INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:

THE BROAD IMPACT OF THE R&D CREDIT IN 2005 (2008) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG REPORT]

(on file with author).
433 See id. at 5 (" [T]he amount of tax credit claimed by corporations is concentrated among
the largest firms .... "). In 2005, 17,700 corporations claimed $6.6 billion in research credits
on their tax returns. Id. at 1. Of these firms, 29% had $1 million in assets or less, 25% had
assets of $1-$5 million, 25% had assets of $5-$25 million, and 21% percent had assets of $25
million or more. Id. Of these corporations, 14,953 had less than $50 million in total assets
and claimed more than $891 million in research credit. Of these corporations, 71.2% had a
Standard Industrial Classification in some type of manufacturing; the remaining 28.8%
included Services, Information, and Agriculture. Id. at 4, 6.
434 See The Tax Code and the New Economy, supra note 351, at 96 (statement of Bill
Sample, Chairman, R&D Credit Coalition) ("The U.S. research community needs a stable,
consistent R&D credit in order to maximize its incentive value and its contribution to the
nation's economic growth and sustain the basis for ongoing technology competitiveness in the
global arena.").
435 See id. at 96-97 (citing to a study by Coopers & Lybrand estimating that a permanent
extension of the research credit would create "$58 billion of economic growth over the 19982010 period, including $33 billion of additional domestic consumption and $12 billion of
additional business investment").
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The Coalition was an instrumental player in the research credit
path and led the way for other legislation-oriented coalitions. 436 Its
self-reinforcement efforts were fruitful in upholding the credit's
inertial path in the 2003437 and 2004438 Tax Cuts Acts. The Working
Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 extended the credit again until the
end of 2005,439 and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
prolonged the credit until the end of 2007.440 This pattern repeated
until 2014.441 At that time, the research credit was the largest and
most popular part 442 of a group of about fifty temporary provisions

set to expire. 443 Certain policymakers objected to an extension
without offsetting the corresponding budgetary cost through budget
cuts or other means. 444 They argued that the price tag of a
permanent extension of the research credit was too high and "would

436 See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International
Competition, and the Challengesof InternationalIncome Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347,
393 (2013) ("[T]he R&D Credit Coalition has become legendary for its ability to maintain R&D
tax incentives."); see, e.g., Legislative, Regulatory, and Legal Issues Tracking, ASS'N NAT'L
ADVERTISERS, https://www.ana.net/content/show/id/advocacy-issues-tracking
(last visited
Mar. 15, 2021) (describing the advocacy activities of the Association of National Advertisers,
a legislation-oriented coalition).
4" Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 301-03,
117 Stat. 752, 758-64 (reducing taxes on dividends and capital gains).
438 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422, 118 Stat. 1418, 1514
(amending incentives to reinvest foreign earnings in U.S. markets).
39
4 Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 301(a)(1), 118 Stat.
1166, 1178 (extending the research credit from June 30, 2004 to December 31, 2005).
440 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 104(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2922,
2934 (extending research credit through 2007). The Act also added a simpler alternative
method that firms could use to calculate the credit. See id. § 104(c), 120 Stat. at 2935-36.
441 See Jackie Calmes, Obama to PitchPermanentTax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at
22 ("As part of his pre-election push to spur the slumping economy ... President Obama this
week will ask Congress to increase and permanently extend a popular but costly tax credit
for businesses' research expenses ... ").
442 See John D. McKinnon, House Votes to PermanentlyExtend Research Tax Credit, WALL
ST. J. (May 20, 2015, 7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-permanentlyextend-research-tax-credit-1432164443 ("Starting last year, congressional Republicans
sought to extend a few of the largest and most popular ones on a permanent basis, without
offsetting the budgetary cost through budget cuts or other means.").
443 See Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4010, 4014
(extending multiple deductions and credits).
444 See McKinnon, supra note 442 (describing the political scuffle in 2015 surrounding the
research credit).
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cost the government about $180 billion over the next decade." 44 5 The
year 2015 was prime for an election-year showdown. The White
House threatened to veto a permanent research credit if funding
was not found for highways and health care. 446 Each party accused
its rival of irresponsible legislation. Democrats blamed the GOP for
creating a massive budget deficit. 447 Republicans accused
Democrats of driving research jobs overseas. 448 The research credit
was in the midst of this power struggle. After some arm twisting, a
vote of 274 to 145 made the research credit permanent for the first
time in its long, transient life. 449

For over three decades, a temporary mechanism intended to
battle entrenchment and allow legislative flexibility formed an
inertial path that ultimately culminated in lock-in. The research
credit was not created to allow repeated rent-extracting
mechanisms; it was intended as a legislative experiment in research
incentives. Indeed, its legislative history reveals that its existence
was often questioned and necessitated extreme measures, such as
retroactive enactments and reinstatements. Nevertheless, this
temporary credit program involved dynamics that reinforced its
path as a superior route, among other alternatives, to encourage

research and experimentation. Thus, viewing the history of the
research credit through the lens of path dependence theory
illustrates that legislative inertia persists or dissipates not
necessarily due to legislative intent or design, but via reactive path
forces or lack thereof.

445

Id.

See Stephen Ohlemacher, House Votes to Make Research Tax Credit Permanent, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 9, 2014, 10:01 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sdut-house-votes-tomake-research-tax-credit-permanent-2014may09-story.html (noting that the White House
threatened to veto the House bill because "if all the 50-plus temporary tax breaks were made
permanent, it would 'add $500 billion or more' to the deficit").
446

447

Id.

448

Id.

In 2015, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes
(PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 121, 129 Stat. 2242, 3040, 3049-50 that made the
credit permanent and, for the first time, permitted small businesses to use the credit to offset
both their regular, Alternative Minimum Tax and payroll tax liabilities.
449
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VI. CONCLUSION

Legislative inertia has come to reflect a malfunction of
democracy. 4 50 Insufficient legislative time and priorities prevent
legislatures from considering the efficacy of existing statutes in
attaining their goal. 451 A presumption in favor of the status quo
creates an extensive barrier for statutory action because upholding
legislative action is more time-consuming and politically costly than
inaction. 452 The result is legislative stagnation and numerous
obsolete rules that do not accord with present-day social
practices. 4 53 In the search for optimal legislation, the last few
decades saw an increasing use of temporary legislation that expires
on its own after a set period of time.4 54
Temporary legislation is one of the most confounding issues for
constituents, lawmakers, and professionals. 455 Every year, Congress
adds new expiring provisions and extends existing ones. Despite its

vast economic impact, our understanding of expiring legislation is
limited by explanations that rely primarily on rent-seeking, leaving
key questions about the life cycle of temporary legislation
unaddressed. This Article provides the first comprehensive
explanation of this phenomenon by drawing on path-dependence
450 See Waldron, supra note 1, at 1389 ("Of course, in the real world, the realization of
political equality through elections, representation, and legislative process is imperfect.").
451 See Dixon, supra note 66, at 2210 ("Capacity constraints of this kind will mean that
there is little reason-or space-for legislative majorities to give priority to rights-based
claims which are advanced by a relatively small minority, if those claims do not command
strong majority support.").
452 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 530 (arguing that high "transaction costs" hinder
constitutional policy change).

453 See supranote 2 and accompanying text.

454 See supra note 31.
455 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Extempore, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 72, 74, 76 (2014)
(suggesting a variety of existing practices and "contexts in which temporary law might
provide a net benefit"); see also Joint Letter: Don'tRevive the Expired Tax Extenders, COMM.
FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (May 6, 2019), https://www.crfb.org/papers/joint-letter-timeend-costly-temporary-tax-provisions (describing a letter urging Congress not to extend
temporary legislation by a coalition of twelve organizations from across the political
spectrum). Recently, scholars have also demonstrated empirically the increasing practice of
temporary legislation. See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Temporary Legislation, Better
Regulation, andExperimentalist Governance: An Empirical Study, 12 REG. & GOVERNANCE
192, 211 (2018) (finding that temporary legislation in Israel is an "increasingly prevalent"
legislative tool).
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theory. It reveals that the path-dependent dynamics of temporary
legislation often result in their own inertial force that can explain
why some temporary provisions enjoy many decades of extensions

and renewals, while others are kept in place for only a few years. By
offering a deeper understanding of temporary legislation and its
evolutionary path, this Article contributes to ongoing debates about
the optimal design of present-day policies and the ability of
legislatures to resist status quo bias and bring about legal change.
Like other meta-legal theories, path dependence does not
prescribe "mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie." 456 Rather, it
can inform legislatures about important facets of legal reality. This
Article urges policymakers and scholars in diverse areas of the law
to consider the ways our legal system employs path-dependence
dynamics. In the case at hand, path-dependence theory
demonstrates that a legal apparatus did not reduce-but rather
exacerbated-unintended legal inertia, thus reinforcing the status
quo bias in our legal system. It confirmed that path dynamics can
create high switching costs that eventually achieve the opposite
result and can entrench policies and programs regardless of their
efficacy.
Path-dependent dynamics may also provide normative insights
for achieving flexible lawmaking while averting inaction.
Surprisingly,

the

solution may

lie in adding more

expiring

limitations rather than abolishing them. For example, Congress can
create a new expiring rule that sets a "three strikes and you're out"
policy by which temporary legislation cannot be extended more than
three times. 457 In the search for optimal statutory change,
lawmakers can adopt default rules that cause enacted, temporary
legislation to revert to a previous iteration of law, bringing back the
alternatives that were available before choosing that particular
policy route. Though, this may not be desirable for either party
because it imposes high switching costs on the legislature and
constituents relying on the current policy. At the same time, these
kinds of default rules may pressure legislators to reach a

466 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 719 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 43 (proposing a mechanism of "active choosing" as a
default rule, which would require people to overcome procrastination and incur effort costs
that might otherwise lead them to focus on other matters).
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consensus. 45 8 Lastly, when choosing between several policy
alternatives, legislators can adopt a temporary rule that enables
experimentation with policy alternatives. If one policy option is
deemed unsuccessful by predetermined objective measures, the law
can default to any number of set alternatives. If it is evident (via
predetermined measures) that the first enacted policy is effective in
achieving its goal, it should be made permanent. These solutions
can potentially enable policymakers to gain the benefits of learning
and experimenting with different policies while avoiding path
dependence through irreversible switching costs. They may enable
programs and policies to entrench due to their merits, rather than
historical accidents.

458 See Listokin, supra note 9, at 536 ("A penalty sunset would introduce an unpleasant
final law that would strongly encourage future legislators to overcome policymaking inertia.
Once legislators overcome this inertia, it is likely (though far from guaranteed) that the
lessons learned through this statutory optimal search would be heeded.").
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VII. APPENDIX: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Year

1986
1988

1989

Legislative Change
Creation of the R&D tax credit scheduled to expire
December 31, 1985.459
Credit lapsed but was retroactively extended and
the rate cut from 25% to 20%.460

Credit extended for one year, but its effectiveness
was reduced by decreasing the deduction for R&D
expenditures by 50% of the credit. 4 61
Credit extended for another year, further reducing
the effectiveness of the credit by decreasing the
deduction for R&D expenditures by a full 100% of
the credit and introducing a focus on start-up
companies. 462

1991
1993

Credit extended for fourteen months through the
end of 1991.463
Credit extended through June 30, 1992.464
Credit was retroactively extended through June 30,

July 1,
1995 to
June 30,June30,Cre

1995.465

dit lapse d.46 6

1996

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 172, 241-47.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231, 100 Stat. 2085, 2173-75.
461 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4008, 102 Stat.
3342, 3652.
462 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 7110, 103 Stat. 2106,
2322-25.
463 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11402, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-473.
464 Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 102, 105 Stat. 1686, 1686.
465 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13111, 107 Stat. 312,
420.
466 See GUENTHER, supra note 325, at 18 n.25 ("The R&E tax credit has been in effect for
each year between July 1, 1981, and the present except for period from July 1, 1995, to June
30, 1996, when it expired.").
469
469
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Legislative Change

2008

Credit extended for eleven months, through May 31,
1997, but was not extended retroactively. The
elective Alternative Incremental Research Credit
(AIRC) added, increasing its flexibility and making
the credit available to R&D-intensive industries
that could not qualify for the credit under the
regular criteria. 467
Credit extended for thirteen months and made
available for expenditures incurred from June 1,
1997 through June 30, 1998, with no gap between
this and the previous extension. 468
Credit extended for one year until June 30, 1999.469
Credit extended until June 30, 2004 and a modest
increase in the AIRC rates was adopted. 470
Credit extended through December 31, 2005.471
Credit revised by adding a 20% credit of payments
for energy research by certain qualified groups. 4 72
Credit extended retroactively through the end of
2007, increased the AIRC rates, and established the
alternative simplified credit. 473
Credit extended retroactively through 2009.474

2010

Credit extended through 2011.475

1996

1997
1998
1999
2004
2005
2006

467 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1204, 110 Stat. 1755,
1773-74.
468 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 601, 111 Stat. 788, 861.
469 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, § 1001, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-888 (1998).
470 Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-170,
§ 502, 113 Stat. 1860, 1919.
471 Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 301, 118 Stat. 1166,
1178.
72
4 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1351, 119 Stat. 594, 1056-58.
4" Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 104, 120 Stat. 2922,
2934-36.
474 Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 301, 122 Stat. 3765, 3865.
475 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 731, 124 Stat. 3296, 3317.
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Legislative Change

After a one-year lapse, the credit extended
retroactively through 2013.476
All four components of the credit extended through
2014.477
PATH Act of 2015 retroactively extended the credit,
made it permanent, and expanded credit provisions
by allowing small businesses to take the credit
against their Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)

2015

2017

liability for tax years beginning after December 31,
2015 and allowing startup businesses with no
federal tax liability and gross receipts of less than
$5 million to take the credit against their payroll
taxes for tax years beginning after December 31,
2015.478
Credit preserved and enhanced 4 79 while eliminating
Section 199 incentives and reducing the value of the
Orphan Drug Credit.480

476 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 301, 126 Stat. 2313, 2326
(2013).
477 Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 111, 128 Stat. 4010, 4014.
78
4 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 121, 129 Stat.
2242, 3049-52.
479
Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13206, 131 Stat. 2054, 2111-13.
480 Id. §§ 13305, 13401, 131 Stat. at 2126, 2133-34.
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